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WHO BLESSES THIS MERGER? 
ANTITRUST’S ROLE IN MAINTAINING 
ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 
CARE IN THE WAKE OF CATHOLIC 
HOSPITAL MERGERS 
Abstract: Over the past two decades, the number of Catholic health care systems 
has steadily expanded throughout the United States, while at the same time, the 
overall number of hospitals in the country has decreased. Today, one in six pa-
tients in the United States receives treatment at a Catholic hospital. Catholic hos-
pitals must abide by the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services, which restrict the medical procedures delivered at these facilities. 
Many common reproductive health care services, such as medically-necessary 
abortions and in-vitro fertilization, are prohibited by these Directives. This Note 
examines the impact of the Catholic hospital merger trend on access to reproduc-
tive health care in the United States. Although reproductive health care advocates 
have succeeded in developing innovative structural remedies to limit the decrease 
in reproductive health care services in communities affected by a Catholic hospi-
tal merger, this Note argues that the 2018 revision to the Directives threatens 
these solutions. Further, this Note proposes that antitrust law may be an effective 
method to regulate the anticompetitive effects of Catholic hospital mergers in the 
provision of reproductive health care. 
INTRODUCTION 
Seventy miles southeast of Tucson, Arizona, in the city of Sierra Vista, a 
woman fifteen weeks pregnant with twins suffered a dangerous miscarriage.1 
After miscarrying one of the twins at home in a bathtub, an ambulance brought 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder at 1 (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/health/documents/abortion/holder-affidavit.pdf [https://perma.cc/EYY3-MQAE]; Sarah Chris-
topherson, Is the Pope in Charge of Your Hospital Bed?, NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK 
NEWSL. (July 12, 2016), https://nwhn.org/pope-charge-hospital-bed/ [https://perma.cc/Y2HN-PHN7]; 
Stephanie Mencimer, Do Bishops Run Your Hospital?, MOTHER JONES (Nov.-Dec. 2013), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/10/catholic-hospitals-bishops-contraception-abortion-health-
care/ [https://perma.cc/5DEG-Z6ZJ]. Sierra Vista is a rural town in southwestern Arizona, and the 
Sierra Vista Regional Health Center is the only hospital in the region. Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, 
Catholic-Secular Hospital Mergers, PBS (Mar. 25, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionand
ethics/2011/03/25/march-25-2011-catholic-secular-hospital-mergers/8431/ [https://perma.cc/7WEH-
9E6L]. 
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her to the emergency room at Sierra Vista Regional Health Center.2 The on-call 
obstetrics and gynecology physician, Dr. Robert Holder, examined the patient, 
consulted with other specialists, and concluded that the mother was at risk of 
extreme hemorrhaging and infection, and the second twin was unlikely to sur-
vive.3 He later described the emergency as an “inevitable miscarriage.”4 Dr. 
Holder counseled the patient and her husband on the high risk of continuing 
the pregnancy and the possible treatment options to end the pregnancy.5 The 
patient and her husband made the difficult decision to terminate the pregnancy 
using a medical treatment.6 The consent form to terminate the pregnancy de-
scribed the procedure as “a miscarriage completion,” and Dr. Holder prepared 
to proceed with the treatment.7 
When the patient came to the emergency room, in November 2010, Sierra 
Vista Regional Health Center, a secular hospital, was engaged in a trial merger 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2. The patient suffered a miscarriage in the 
early morning of November 26, 2010, and she arrived at the hospital at about 9:30 AM that same day. 
Id. 
 3 Id. at 1–2; Mencimer, supra note 1. Dr. Holder later testified that he gave the patient an ultra-
sound, and the second fetus had a heartbeat. Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 1. The 
placenta from the first twin was still inside the patient’s uterus, and the umbilical cord was emerging 
from the patient. Id. Dr. Karen Lesser at University Medical Center in Tucson gave Dr. Holder guid-
ance on possible courses of action. Id. To terminate the pregnancy, he could either surgically remove 
the fetus from the uterus or use a medication. Id. The medication treatment was the viable treatment, 
because Sierra Vista Regional Health Center did not have the proper resources to surgically evacuate a 
patient at that stage in pregnancy. Id. Dr. Holder testified that tying the umbilical cord to protect the 
second twin has a high risk of infection. Id. 
 4 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2. Dr. Holder testified that the chances of a 
successful pregnancy were “miniscule.” Id. at 1–2. He also later told the National Women’s Law 
Center that the second twin was “in a hopeless situation.” Press Release, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., 
Women’s Health & Lives at Risk Due to Religious Restrictions at Hospitals, New Center Study 
Shows (Jan. 20, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/health/documents/abortion/ibis-press-
release-final-01202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6QP-DL7L]. The National Women’s Law Center is a 
non-profit organization that defends the legal rights of women and families. Id. 
 5 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2. Dr. Holder informed the patient and her hus-
band of the two options to terminate the pregnancy, the medication and the surgical evacuation that 
Sierra Vista could not perform, as well as the high risk and unlikely success of continuing the preg-
nancy. Id. 
 6 Id.; Jonathan Cohn, Unholy Alliance, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 22, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/
article/100960/catholic-church-hospital-health-care-contraception [https://perma.cc/9L7A-MZ2L]. Dr. 
Holder testified that the patient and her husband were both distressed by the decision. Affidavit of Dr. 
Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2; Cohn, supra. He further noted that the patient’s husband seemed to 
struggle with the choice. Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2. When speaking with the 
National Women’s Law Center about the incident, Dr. Holder described it as a “tragic, heart-
wrenching decision” for the patient and her husband. Press Release, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., supra 
note 4. 
 7 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2. Attempting to continue the pregnancy would 
jeopardize the patient’s health because the umbilical cord and placenta from the first twin were still 
inside her uterus and she could develop a dangerous infection. Christopherson, supra note 1. Thus, 
completing the miscarriage would avoid these severe health complications. Id. 
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with Carondelet Health Network, a Catholic hospital system.8 Catholic hospi-
tals must abide by the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services (Directives), which are published by the United States Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), and outlines ethical and moral limitations 
on the services that Catholic hospitals may provide their patients.9 In particu-
lar, the Directives prohibit many reproductive health services, including abor-
tions, contraception, tubal ligations, and in vitro fertilization.10 During the trial 
merger, Sierra Vista Regional Health Center had to comply with the Direc-
                                                                                                                           
 8 Mencimer, supra note 1. Sierra Vista Regional Health Center affiliated with Carondelet Health 
Network on April 17, 2010. Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2. Dr. Holder later spoke 
to the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) about the merger, explaining that most of the medical staff 
opposed the merger, because it would be difficult for a rural, secular hospital like Sierra Vista Region-
al Health Center to implement the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 
(Directives). Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, supra note 1. A merger occurs when two or more corpo-
rate entities agree to combine into one corporation with a shared governance structure, usually in 
exchange for stock or other financial assets. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2019) (explaining what 
constitutes a merger or consolidation under Delaware law); Merger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019). In Sierra Vista, the proposed merger between Carondelet and the hospital was intended to be a 
two-year commitment, as the two entities “assess[ed] the mutual value of formalizing a long-term part-
nership.” Stephanie Innes, Tucson Health: Carondelet and Sierra Vista Medical Center Dissolve Agree-
ment, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Mar. 29, 2011), https://tucson.com/news/blogs/health/tucson-health-
carondelet-and-sierra-vista-medical-center-dissolve-agreement/article_e98acc9e-5a52-11e0-9779-
001cc4c03286.html [https://perma.cc/89CH-DJWM] (quoting a statement from both parties when 
they dissolved their trial merger). 
 9 U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHO-
LIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 9 (6th ed. 2018) [hereinafter 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIREC-
TIVES]. The Directives dictate health care services in Catholic hospitals across the country. LOIS 
UTTLEY ET AL., MERGERWATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE: THE 
GROWTH OF CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND THE THREAT TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE 2 (2013). 
These rules promulgated by Catholic bishops prohibit medical procedures that conflict with the moral 
teachings of the Catholic Church, including reproductive health services. Id. The Catholic Church 
describes the Directives as having two purposes, “to reaffirm the ethical standards of behavior in 
health care that flow from the Church’s teaching about the dignity of the human person” and “to pro-
vide authoritative guidance on certain moral issues that face Catholic health care today.” 2018 ETHI-
CAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra, at 4. 
 10 UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 2; Hayley Penan & Amy Chen, The Ethical & Religious Direc-
tives: What the 2018 Update Means for Catholic Hospital Mergers, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, Jan. 2, 
2019, at 1, https://9kqpw4dcaw91s37kozm5jx17-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/
01/Fact-Sheet-ERD-2018-Update-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZH5-6U9S]. Contraception refers to 
methods used to prevent a woman from becoming pregnant, such as daily birth control pills or con-
doms. MedlinePlus, Birth Control, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://medlineplus.gov/birthcontrol.html 
[https://perma.cc/6V6P-CZVW]. Tubal ligation is a surgical procedure in which a woman’s fallopian 
tubes are cut and closed between the uterus and ovaries, to permanently prevent pregnancy. Med-
linePlus, Tubal Ligation, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://medlineplus.gov/tuballigation.html [https://
perma.cc/J8RJ-DN88]. In vitro fertilization, or IVF, is the process in which an egg and sperm are 
combined outside the body to grow an embryo, before placing it in a woman’s womb. MedlinePlus, In 
Vitro Fertilization (IVF), U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007279.htm 
[https://perma.cc/D7T6-7JSY]. 
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tives.11 When Dr. Holder remembered that certain procedures needed approval, 
he sought the necessary approval to perform the procedure from the hospital 
administration, as required under the Directives.12 
The hospital’s Vice President of Medical Services only asked Dr. Holder 
if there was a detectable heartbeat in the second fetus.13 Upon hearing that 
there was a heartbeat, she informed Dr. Holder that the patient could not end 
the pregnancy at Sierra Vista Regional Health Center.14 She did not inquire 
into the patient’s medical condition or the implications of transferring the pa-
tient.15 
Dr. Holder updated the distraught patient and her husband that Sierra 
Vista Regional Health Center would not be able to perform the procedure and 
that she would have to be transferred to another facility to seek such medical 
care.16 The patient was then transferred to the University Medical Center, in 
Tucson, for treatment.17 The transfer took an hour and a half and put the pa-
tient in danger of extreme bleeding and an infection, as well as substantial 
emotional distress.18 Her treatment was ultimately postponed by three hours 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Mencimer, supra note 1. The trial merger terms required doctors to receive permission from 
hospital administrators for certain procedures to ensure that the procedure was allowed. Affidavit of 
Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2. 
 12 Id.; Press Release, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., supra note 4. Dr. Holder first discussed the medica-
tion treatment for the miscarriage with the Nurse Manager of Obstetrics, Lorena Warren. Affidavit of 
Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2. Ms. Warren told Dr. Holder that she needed to verify with the 
hospital’s Vice President of Medical Services, Rebecca McCalmont, that the Directives permitted the 
treatment. Id. 
 13 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2; Cohn, supra note 6. Ms. McCalmont, the 
hospital’s Vice President of Medical Services, called Dr. Holder with the hospital’s decision regarding 
the treatment thirty minutes after Ms. Warren, Nurse Manager of Obstetrics, contacted her. Affidavit 
of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2. 
 14 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2.; Cohn, supra note 6. Ms. McCalmont told 
Dr. Holder that he needed to transfer the patient to another facility to receive the care she needed to 
terminate the pregnancy. Cohn, supra note 6. She had to be transferred eighty miles to the University 
Medical Center in Tucson, the closest major hospital to rural Sierra Vista, simply because the second 
twin had a heartbeat. Id.; Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, supra note 1. 
 15 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 2–3; Christopherson, supra note 1. Ms. 
McCalmont addressed only the fetal heartbeat, not the risk to the health of the patient. Christopherson, 
supra note 1. 
 16 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 3. Dr. Holder told the National Women’s Law 
Center that he was “told to inform this already traumatized couple that their decision was seen as 
‘unethical’ per the Directives.” Press Release, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., supra note 4 (emphasis omit-
ted). The patient and her husband may have been aware of the recent affiliation with Carondelet 
Health Network, but they did not understand its effect on medical treatment. Christopherson, supra 
note 1. 
 17 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 3. Dr. Lesser, who originally gave Dr. Holder 
advice on treatment options for the patient, accepted the patient’s transfer to her care at the University 
Medical Center in Tucson. Id. 
 18 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 3; Cohn, supra note 6. Dr. Holder testified that 
the transfer mandated by Sierra Vista Regional Health Center risked the health of the patient. Affida-
vit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 3. 
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because of the transfer.19 Dr. Holder later testified that the hospital’s actions 
prevented him from treating his patient to the best of his ability and in line 
with scientifically accepted standards of care.20 In the wake of local protests 
coinciding with this patient’s experience, the merger between Sierra Vista Re-
gional Health and Carondelet Health Network fell apart.21 
Today, one out of every six hospital patients in the United States seeks 
care in a Catholic hospital.22 In Alaska, Iowa, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
South Dakota, approximately two out of every five patients are treated in 
Catholic hospitals.23 More than one in seven acute care hospitals in the United 
States were Catholic in 2016.24 Furthermore, the number of Catholic acute care 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 3. 
 20 Id. Dr. Holder later explained to the National Women’s Law Center that he was “ashamed and 
angered” when he had to transfer the patient, because she should have been able to receive this treat-
ment at Sierra Vista. Press Release, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., supra note 4. 
 21 Christopherson, supra note 1. Although community members were already protesting the trial 
merger, the outrage following the experience of Dr. Holder’s patient and her husband further fueled 
the protests, and the affiliation ceased a few months thereafter. Id. In addition to protesting the pa-
tient’s treatment and other situations like it, protestors also demonstrated because Sierra Vista Re-
gional Health Center is a rural facility, leaving no other local hospitals for patients to turn to when 
they needed procedures banned by the Directives. See Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, supra note 1 
(noting that one protestor was concerned about the merger given the community’s high teen pregnan-
cy rate). PBS interviewed several protestors outside of the health center every weekday morning, as 
well as obstetrics and gynecology physicians who disagreed with the trial merger. Id. Dr. Bruce Silva, 
a colleague of Dr. Holder, introduced the PBS reporter to his patient Jessica Graham, who planned to 
get a tubal ligation after delivering her second child via caesarian section at Sierra Vista Regional 
Health Center. Id. Due to the trial merger, Ms. Graham had to change her birth plan and undergo a 
second surgery in a different facility for the tubal ligation, which presented the risk of infection and 
complications. Id. The doctors told PBS that they believed Sierra Vista Regional Health Center could 
find another larger provider to work with that would not restrict their medical decisions based on the 
Directives. Id. 
 22 LOIS UTTLEY & CHRISTINE KHAIKIN, MERGERWATCH, GROWTH OF CATHOLIC HOSPITALS 
AND HEALTH SYSTEMS: 2016 UPDATE ON THE MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE REPORT 1 (2016); Katie 
Hafner, As Catholic Hospitals Expand, So Do Limits on Some Procedures, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/health/catholic-hospitals-procedures.html [https://perma.
cc/V66D-N9MD]; see CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., U.S. CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE (2019), 
https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/cha_2019_miniprofile.pdf?sf
vrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/D2DK-TJ7S] (stating that on a daily basis, more than 14% of patients receive 
care in a Catholic hospital). When a Catholic hospital acquires a non-Catholic hospital, the non-
Catholic hospital must agree to abide by the Directives as a condition of the merger. 2018 ETHICAL 
AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. Therefore, throughout this Note, “Catholic hospi-
tals” refers to those hospitals that follow all or part of the Directives, whether they became Catholic 
through acquisition or already were Catholic. See supra notes 1–22 and accompanying text; infra 
notes 23–264 and accompanying text. Additionally, because hospitals may be public, non-profit, for-
profit, or affiliated with other religious institutions, this Note refers to any hospital that does not abide 
by the Directives as “non-Catholic.” See supra notes 1–22 and accompanying text; infra notes 23–264 
and accompanying text. 
 23 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 1. In Nebraska, Colorado, Missouri, Oregon, and Ken-
tucky, approximately 35% of patients are treated in Catholic hospitals. Id. 
 24 JULIA KAYE ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HEALTH CARE DENIED: PATIENTS AND 
PHYSICIANS SPEAK OUT ABOUT CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND THE THREAT TO WOMEN’S HEALTH AND 
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hospitals in the United States continues to grow, increasing by 22% from 2001 
to 2016, although the overall number of acute care hospitals decreased by 
6%.25 In 2016, four of the ten largest hospital systems in the country, Ascen-
sion Health, Catholic Health Initiatives, Trinity Health, and Dignity Health, 
were Catholic.26 The growth of Catholic hospital systems across the country 
reduces access to reproductive health services, because when Catholic hospi-
tals acquire non-Catholic hospitals, the non-Catholic hospitals typically must 
adopt the Catholic Church’s Directives.27 
This Note explores the impact that the increase in Catholic hospital mergers 
has on access to reproductive health services in the United States.28 Part I of the 
Note discusses the factors that contribute to this decrease in services, specifically 
the revised Directives, the recent growth in hospital merger and acquisition ac-
tivity since passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and the antitrust regulato-
ry review scheme for Catholic hospital mergers.29 Part II reviews several innova-
tive legal methods to combat the reduction in reproductive health services that 
result from these mergers.30 Further, Part II explains that although reproductive 
health care advocates have been successful in mitigating the effects of these 
mergers by creating separate entities that continue to offer services forbidden by 
the Catholic Church, the recently updated 2018 Directives prohibit these reme-
dies.31 Part III argues that the reduction in reproductive health services is an an-
ticompetitive effect that harms consumers, and thus antitrust law may be an ef-
                                                                                                                           
LIVES 22 (2016); UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 1. This Note specifically examines the provi-
sion of reproductive health care at acute care hospitals and uses the terms “acute care hospitals” and 
“hospitals” interchangeably. See CMS Data Navigator Glossary of Terms, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/Research
GenInfo/Downloads/DataNav_Glossary_Alpha.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8TH-FBFV] (defining an 
acute care hospital as one “that provides inpatient medical care and other related services for surgery, 
acute medical conditions or injuries (usually for a short term illness or condition)”); see supra notes 
1–24 and accompanying text; infra notes 25–264 and accompanying text. 
 25 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 1, 3, 8 (“The[] top [ten] Catholic health systems now 
control 384 acute care hospitals, up from 330 hospitals in 2011 and 259 in 2001.”). 
 26 Id. at 9. In 2019, Catholic Health Initiatives merged with Dignity Health to create Com-
monSpirit Health, further consolidating the industry. Alex Kacik, Catholic Health Initiatives, Dignity 
Health Combine to Form CommonSpirit Health, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.
modernhealthcare.com/article/20190201/NEWS/190209994/catholic-health-initiatives-dignity-health-
combine-to-form-commonspirit-health [https://perma.cc/NZU9-2JWQ]. This transaction, worth more 
than $29 billion, combined 142 hospitals across the country. Id. In late 2018, the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) and the California Department of Justice approved the merger, and it was finalized in 
early 2019. Id. 
 27 See UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 1 (explaining that as Catholic hospitals acquire non-
Catholic hospitals, the non-Catholic hospitals must comply with the Directives, leading to removal of 
reproductive health services that conflict with the Catholic Church’s ethical and moral beliefs). 
 28 See infra notes 34–264 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra Part I. 
 30 See infra Part II.A. 
 31 See infra Part II.B. 
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fective tool to address the concerns raised by the decrease in the availability of 
reproductive care and combat the restrictive 2018 Directives.32 Finally, Part III 
addresses the shortcomings of using antitrust to preserve reproductive health 
care post-merger and offers possible alternative solutions.33 
I. THE GROWTH OF CATHOLIC HOSPITAL SYSTEMS AND RESULTING 
LIMITATIONS ON REPRODUCTIVE CARE 
The number of Catholic hospitals is rising as part of the increase in mer-
ger activity occurring among U.S. hospitals in the past two decades.34 As a re-
sult, more hospitals in the United States must follow the Catholic health care 
restrictions outlined by the Directives and cannot offer counseling on several 
reproductive health services.35 Section A of this Part discusses the history of 
the Directives, the medical procedures prohibited by the Directives, and the 
2018 revision to the Directives.36 Section B examines the impact of the ACA 
on hospital merger activity, the antitrust and Vatican regulatory review process 
for hospital mergers, and their combined impact on the reduced provision of 
reproductive health services throughout the country.37 
A. The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 
Catholic hospitals in the United States follow the Directives, which are 
published by the USCCB and were recently updated in 2018 to include five 
additional Directives concerning health care collaborations between Catholic 
and non-Catholic hospitals.38 The following Subsections provide an overview 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra Part III.A. 
 33 See infra Part III.B–C. 
 34 See UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 1 (discussing the growth in Catholic hospital sys-
tems in the United States). This phenomenon was referred to in 1997 as “Catholic hospital merger 
mania.” Judith C. Appelbaum & Jill C. Morrison, Hospital Mergers and the Threat to Women’s Re-
productive Health Services: Applying the Antitrust Laws, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 7 
(2001) (quoting Rhonda L. Rundle, Hardly Meek: Catholic Hospitals, in Big Merger Drive, Battle 
Industry Giants, WALL STREET J., Mar. 12, 1997, at A1). There have recently been two large increas-
es in general hospital mergers in the United States—in the 1990s and again in the 2010s. Leemore 
Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation—Still More to Come?, 370 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 198, 198 
(2014). 
 35 See UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 1 (explaining that as Catholic hospitals acquire non-
Catholic hospitals, the non-Catholic hospitals must comply with the Directives, leading to the removal 
of reproductive health services that conflict with the Catholic Church’s ethical and moral beliefs). 
 36 See infra Part I.A. 
 37 See infra Part I.B. 
 38 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 2, 23–26; Sandra M. DiVarco & 
Kerrin B. Slattery, Compliance Concerns for Catholic Health Care Collaborations, LAW360 (Sept. 5, 
2018), https://www.mwe.com/insights/compliance-concerns-catholic-health-collaborations [https://
perma.cc/H8ED-FFZS]. 
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of the Directives, including their history, the services they prohibit, and the 
2018 update.39 
1. The History of the Directives 
The ethical norms governing Catholic health care have been revised at 
least eight times over the past century to comport with changing medical 
standards and the evolving legal landscape.40 In 1915, the Catholic Hospital 
Association was established to preserve Catholic health care institutions’ rights 
and to develop a set of ethical directives.41 Six years later, the first written set 
of Directives regarding ethical norms was posted in operating rooms of Catho-
lic hospitals throughout the country.42 These rules specifically pertained to sur-
gical procedures that could terminate fetal life or result in sterilization.43 The 
Catholic Hospital Association intended for all Catholic hospitals to follow the 
Directives, but they had to be approved by the local diocese before being im-
plemented.44 During the 1960s, however, more liberal dioceses began constru-
ing the Directives more leniently with respect to contraception, a phenomenon 
that became known as “geographical morality.”45 To counteract these incon-
sistencies, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops developed a new cata-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See infra notes 40–72 and accompanying text. 
 40 See Kevin D. O’Rourke et al., A Brief History: A Summary of the Development of the Ethical 
and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, HEALTH PROGRESS, Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 
19 (listing the six variations of ethical norms published through 2001). See generally 2018 ETHICAL 
AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9; U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND 
RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter 2009 
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES]. The 2009 and 2018 updates to the Directives constitute the 
seventh and eighth revisions to the Directives. 2009 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra; 
2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9. 
 41 CHRISTOPHER J. KAUFFMAN, MINISTRY AND MEANING: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF CATHOLIC 
HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 169 (1995); O’Rourke et al., supra note 40, at 18. The Catholic 
Hospital Association is now known as the Catholic Health Association. KAUFFMAN, supra, at 303; 
O’Rourke et al., supra note 40, at 18. 
 42 O’Rourke et al., supra note 40, at 18. In 1921, Reverend Michael Burke of the Archdiocese of 
Detroit wrote the Surgical Code for Catholic Hospitals. Id. 
 43 Id. Because these rules did not address the theological role in medicine, the Catholic Hospital 
Association sought to create a more detailed set of Directives, published in 1949 and revised in 1956. 
Id. at 18–19. 
 44 Id. at 19. The local diocese was authorized to formally parse the Directives in accordance with 
its individual beliefs, although most interpretations were aligned with that of the Catholic Hospital 
Association. Id. 
 45 Id. Specifically, the more liberal dioceses interpreted the Directives concerning contraception 
and family planning more freely than other dioceses. Id. The liberal dioceses justified their interpreta-
tion on the moral reasoning of “proportionalism.” Id. This theory suggested that the fundamental goal 
of an action, such as providing a married couple with access to birth control, is of greater moral im-
portance than the deed itself. Id. at 19 n.10. Pope John Paul II, however, contradicted this concept in 
his Veritatis Splendor, where he preached that certain behaviors are “intrinsically evil,” even if they 
are done with good intentions. Id. 
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log of Directives in 1971.46 The Catholic Church pressured dioceses to adopt 
the 1971 Directives in their entirety after the Supreme Court recognized a 
women’s right to choose to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade in 1973.47 
When the USCCB revised the Directives again in 2001, they addressed 
hospital mergers and made changes to the section on partnerships and coopera-
tion with other health care providers.48 They specifically forbade Catholic 
health care institutions from cooperating in medical procedures that are con-
sidered “intrinsically evil” by the Catholic Church, including direct steriliza-
tion.49 The USCCB revised the Directives again in 2009, and more recently in 
2018, to significantly change the Directives as they relate to hospital mergers 
with non-Catholic institutions.50 
2. Prohibited Services 
The Directives, which are organized in six parts, list seventy-seven rules 
that Catholic health care institutions must obey when delivering care to pa-
                                                                                                                           
 46 KAUFFMAN, supra note 41, at 290; O’Rourke et al., supra note 40, at 19. The National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops is today known as the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB). O’Rourke et al., supra note 40, at 19. The 1971 Directives were more like a set of legal 
rules, as they strictly prohibited certain reproductive procedures, rather than being rooted in theologi-
cal teachings like their predecessors. KAUFFMAN, supra note 41, at 290; O’Rourke et al., supra note 
40, at 20. In 1994, the bishops again revised the Directives to include references to the theological 
bases for the rules. O’Rourke et al., supra note 40, at 20. The 1994 Directives, while still focusing on 
moral and ethical obligations, also discussed the importance of providing access to health care to 
underserved populations. Id. 
 47 O’Rourke et al., supra note 40, at 19; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114, 164 (1973) 
(recognizing that a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion falls under the right to privacy, which 
is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 48 O’Rourke et al., supra note 40, at 21. In 2001, the USCCB edited Part Six of the Directives, 
which focuses on collaborations with other health care systems, due to the complex issues arising out 
of an increasing number of partnerships between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals. Id. 
 49 Id. (referencing Directive 70 of U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RE-
LIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (4th ed. 2001), which holds that 
“Catholic health care organizations are not permitted to engage in immediate material cooperation in 
actions that are intrinsically immoral, such as abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and direct sterili-
zation”). Although the bishops addressed cooperation with non-Catholic hospitals in the 1994 revi-
sion, they received complaints that the language was confusing with respect to what the Catholic 
Church meant by “cooperation.” Id. at 20–21. Thus, in the 2001 revision, the USCCB gave examples 
of the medical procedures it considered “intrinsically immoral” to provide more explicit guidance. Id. 
at 21. 
 50 See 2009 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 40, at 34–37 (revising Part Six, 
titled “Forming New Partnerships with Health Care Organizations and Providers”); 2018 ETHICAL 
AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 3 (adding “Collaborative Arrangements with Other 
Health Care Organizations and Providers”). One of the goals of the 2018 update was to “reflect the 
growing number and complexity of collaborative arrangements taking place throughout health care.” 
U.S. Bishops Revise Part Six of the Ethical and Religious Directives: An Initial Analysis by CHA 
Ethicists, HEALTH CARE ETHICS USA (Cath. Health Ass’n, Wash., D.C.), Summer 2018, at 12. 
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tients.51 The Directives address “The Social Responsibility of Catholic Health 
Care Services,” “Pastoral and Spiritual Responsibility,” the relationship be-
tween health care professionals and patients, “Beginning of Life” care, “Care 
for the Seriously Ill and Dying,” and “Collaborative Arrangements with Other 
Health Care Organizations and Providers.”52 
Several Directives prohibit reproductive health care services that are oth-
erwise generally accepted by the medical community.53 For example, Directive 
45 states that abortion is never allowed, even when the health of the mother is 
at risk.54 Additionally, Directive 53 interdicts direct sterilization for both men 
and women, and Directive 52 forbids counseling on contraceptive practices.55 
Furthermore, Directives 40 and 41 prohibit in vitro fertilization techniques.56 
Not only must Catholic health care institutions abide by these Directives, but 
                                                                                                                           
 51 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 4–5. These Directives are rules 
that direct how health care and medicine should be administered in all Catholic hospitals across the 
country. Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 1. 
 52 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 3 (listing the six parts of the Di-
rectives). 
 53 Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 1; see 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 
9, at 18–19. The medical procedures banned by the Directives are universally accepted, including 
abortion, sterilization, in vitro fertilization, birth control, emergency contraception including in the 
event of sexual assault, and certain miscarriage procedures. Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 1. 
 54 UTTLEY ET AL.,  supra note 9, at 2; see 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 
9, at 18–19 (“Abortion . . . is never permitted.”). For example, in 2009, a twenty-seven-year-old wom-
an was eleven weeks pregnant and suffered from pulmonary hypertension when she arrived at the 
emergency room of St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center in Phoenix, Arizona. Cohn, supra note 
6; Mencimer, supra note 1; Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, supra note 1. The emergency room doc-
tors examined the patient, a mother of four, and decided that because pulmonary hypertension has a 
high mortality rate, she would not survive unless the pregnancy was terminated. Cohn, supra note 6; 
Mencimer, supra note 1; Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, supra note 1. Because the patient’s life was 
in danger, Sister Margaret McBridge authorized the abortion, even though it was a Catholic hospital. 
Cohn, supra note 6; Mencimer, supra note 1; Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, supra note 1. The pa-
tient’s life was saved, but Bishop Thomas Olmsted of the Catholic Diocese of Phoenix excommuni-
cated the nun and the hospital lost its 116-year Catholic affiliation. Cohn, supra note 6; Mencimer, 
supra note 1; Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, supra note 1. Additionally, when a pregnant woman 
has cancer, the Directives allow doctors to give the woman chemotherapy, even though it will termi-
nate the pregnancy, but doctors cannot directly give the woman an abortion before the chemotherapy. 
Mencimer, supra note 1. 
 55 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 19. Directive 53 prohibits both 
permanent and temporary sterilization. Id. It does allow for procedures that may result in sterility if 
their “direct effect is the cure or alleviation of a present and serious pathology and a simpler treatment 
is not available.” Id. For example, if a woman has uterine cancer and the only cure is a hysterectomy, 
this procedure would be permitted even though it results in sterilization. KAYE ET AL., supra note 24, 
at 7 n.6. Directive 52 states that instead of offering contraceptive counseling, health care providers 
should offer guidance on the Church’s beliefs with respect to “responsible parenthood.” 2018 ETHI-
CAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 19. 
 56 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 18. Directive 40 explains that 
heterologous fertilization is “contrary to the covenant of marriage.” Id. Heterologous fertilization, a 
form of IVF, involves combining an egg and sperm outside the body to grow an embryo, before plac-
ing it in a woman’s womb. MedlinePlus, In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 10. 
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providers must agree to follow them as a prerequisite for admitting privileges 
at Catholic hospitals.57 
The Directives, especially those highlighted above, are often at issue dur-
ing merger negotiations when a Catholic hospital or health care provider is 
seeking to acquire a non-Catholic facility.58 Directive 70 emphasizes that when 
a Catholic institution collaborates with a non-Catholic health care organization, 
the Catholic facility is “not permitted to engage in immediate material coop-
eration in actions that are intrinsically immoral, such as abortion, euthanasia, 
assisted suicide, and direct sterilization.”59 Thus, non-Catholic hospitals ac-
quired by Catholic hospitals are expected to follow the Directives as a precon-
dition of the merger, and may be forced to eliminate certain reproductive 
health services in order to complete the transaction.60 
                                                                                                                           
 57 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 9. A doctor with admitting privi-
leges is authorized to admit patients to a certain hospital or health care facility. Admitting Privilege 
Definition, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG, www.healthinsurance.org/glossary/admitting-privilege/ [https://
perma.cc/PR9H-ZQXA]. Thus, Directive 5’s constraint on admitting privileges limits doctors in pri-
vate practice who are affiliated with Catholic hospitals. Nina Martin, Catholic Bishops Vote to Revise 
Rules for Health Care Partnerships, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/
article/catholic-bishops-weigh-tightening-rules-for-health-care-partnerships [https://perma.cc/V8ST-
RG47] [hereinafter Martin, Catholic Bishops Vote to Revise Rules]; see 2018 ETHICAL AND RELI-
GIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 9 (“Catholic health care services must . . . require adherence to 
them within the institution as a condition for medical privileges and employment.”). For instance, in 
Bartlesville, Oklahoma, Jane Phillips Medical Center, a hospital owned by the large Catholic health 
system Ascension Health, prohibited all doctors with admitting privileges from prescribing contracep-
tives in their local practices. Martin, Catholic Bishops Vote to Revise Rules, supra; Molly Sparks, 
JPMC Doctors No Longer Allowed to Prescribe Birth Control, BARTLESVILLE EXAMINER-
ENTERPRISE (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.examiner-enterprise.com/article/20140328/NEWS/3032
89824 [https://perma.cc/N7FB-QEFB]. 
 58 Lois Uttley et al., Merging Catholic and Non-Sectarian Hospitals: New York State Models for 
Addressing the Ethical Challenges, 17 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N HEALTH L.J. 38, 38 (2012) [hereinafter 
Uttley et al., New York State Model]. Negotiations surrounding a non-Catholic hospital’s post-merger 
observance of the Directives are difficult and may determine the outcome of the merger. Id. Doctors 
and the board of directors at the non-Catholic hospital may protest the adoption of the Directives, as 
they may contradict their ethical beliefs, as well as generally accepted medical practice. Id. For exam-
ple, in May 2019, a proposed affiliation between University of California San Francisco (UCSF), a 
renowned teaching hospital, and Dignity Health, a hospital system with roots in the Catholic Church, 
was stopped after more than 1,800 UCSF physicians and medical staff signed a petition opposing the 
transaction. Nanette Asimov, Following Outcry, UCSF Ends Talks to Expand Partnership with Digni-
ty Health, S.F. CHRON., (May 28, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Following-
outcry-UCSF-ends-talks-to-expand-13902018.php [https://perma.cc/7W2R-2CU4]. The petitioners 
opposed the affiliation because UCSF physicians practicing at Dignity Health hospitals would have to 
abide by the Directives at those facilities. Id. 
 59 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 25. The footnote to Directive 70 
notes that although many acts can be considered “intrinsically evil,” the four listed in the Directive are 
the most urgent issues in modern medicine. Id. at 25 n.48. 
 60 UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 1–2; Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 38. 
When a Catholic hospital merges with a non-Catholic hospital, the non-Catholic hospital must agree 
to follow the Directives. Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 38. As of 2018, about 
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3. 2018 Update to the Directives 
The changes to the sixth edition of the Directives, adopted in 2018, con-
cern Catholic hospital mergers and similar collaborations.61 Part Six of the Di-
rectives, formerly entitled “Forming New Partnerships with Health Care Or-
ganizations and Providers,” is now called “Collaborative Arrangements with 
Other Health Care Organizations and Providers.”62 This section was signifi-
cantly re-written and expanded, with the goal of addressing the recent surge in 
Catholic hospital mergers with non-Catholic hospitals and clarifying the Direc-
tives’ application in these transactions.63 
The USCCB added five Directives to the sixth edition to provide addi-
tional clarity on how enduring doctrines should be reconciled with modern 
merger and acquisition activity among Catholic hospitals.64 First, Directive 73 
prevents administrations and employees of a Catholic hospital from engaging 
with “immoral procedures” in any way after affiliating with a non-Catholic 
institution.65 Directive 74 states that “[i]n any kind of collaboration, whatever 
                                                                                                                           
thirty non-Catholic hospitals that recently merged with Catholic institutions must abide by the Direc-
tives. Hafner, supra note 22. 
 61 Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 3. 
 62 Compare 2009 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 40, at 34 (titling Part Six as 
“Forming New Partnerships with Health Care Organizations and Providers”), with 2018 ETHICAL AND 
RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 23 (revising the title to Part Six to “Collaborative Arrange-
ments with Other Health Care Organizations and Providers”). 
 63 See Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 3, 7 (explaining that the additional Directives “are intend-
ed to help better manage the growing incidence of Catholic hospital mergers”); U.S. Bishops Revise 
Part Six of the Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 50, at 12 (clarifying that the USCCB re-
vised the Directives in 2018 for two distinct reasons: “to update the Directives to reflect the growing 
number and complexity of collaborative arrangements taking place throughout health care” and “to 
reflect the ‘Principles for Collaboration’ that were issued by the Congregation of the Doctrine of the 
Faith” in 2014). Compare 2009 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 40, at 34–37 (list-
ing only seventy-two Directives), with 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 
23–26 (adding Directives 73 through 77, which concern collaborative agreements and cooperation 
with other health care organizations). The Principles for Collaboration were issued in 2014 in re-
sponse to an inquiry from U.S. bishops regarding health care affiliations between Catholic and non-
Catholic institutions. Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Some Principles for Collaboration with 
Non-Catholic Entities in the Provision of Health Care Services, 2014 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 
337, 337–38; U.S. Bishops Revise Part Six of the Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 50, at 
12. 
 64 See DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38 (noting that the new Directives state “long-standing . . . 
principles”); U.S. Bishops Revise Part Six of the Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 50, at 12 
(stating that the revised Directives “do not contain any new teaching” but are intended to address the 
confusion with respect to the application of the Directives in cooperative arrangements with non-
Catholic institutions and give “more explicit direction”). 
 65 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26; DiVarco & Slattery, supra 
note 38. It is possible, however, that when a non-Catholic hospital merely affiliates with a Catholic 
hospital, the employees will remain separately employed by their respective hospitals, and only the 
Catholic hospital employees are bound by the Directives. See 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIREC-
TIVES, supra note 9, at 26 (emphasizing that the Catholic institution’s employees may not participate 
in “immoral procedures,” even if the affiliated non-Catholic facility provides them); DiVarco & Slat-
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comes under the control of the Catholic institution . . . must be operated in full 
accord with the moral teaching of the Catholic Church, including the[] Direc-
tives.”66 Thus, when a Catholic hospital affiliates with a non-Catholic institu-
tion, but the non-Catholic institution remains independently managed, it does 
not automatically have to comply with the Directives.67 Directive 77 specifies 
that if a Catholic hospital does accommodate any “immoral procedures,” the 
local bishop must be informed, and the Catholic institution should rectify the 
divergence from the Directives.68 
Most significantly, Directive 75 explicitly prohibits merging hospitals from 
creating a separate entity to provide the abovementioned “immoral procedures,” 
such as certain reproductive health services.69 This new Directive appears to ad-
                                                                                                                           
tery, supra note 38 (stressing that post-affiliation, hospital administrators and employees must be kept 
separate if the non-Catholic facility continues to provide “immoral procedures”). This Directive af-
fects hospital transactions going forward, as any affiliated Catholic hospital must clearly separate its 
administration and employees from an affiliated non-Catholic hospital that may be providing medical 
services in conflict with the Directives. DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38. The Directives state that 
“immoral actions” are those that conflict with “‘the singular dignity of the human person.’” 2018 
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 23 (citing Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splen-
dor, ¶ 13 (1993), http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_
06081993_veritatis-splendor.html [https://perma.cc/2MWW-D6VV]). Examples of “immoral proce-
dures” include “abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and direct sterilization.” Id. at 25. 
 66 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. Directive 74 applies to col-
laborations or acquisitions where another health care institution is “under the control” of a Catholic 
facility. Id. When referencing the Catholic Church’s “moral teaching,” the Directives focus on moral 
theology and the “dignity of the human person.” Id. at 4. 
 67 See id. at 26 (noting that only the entity that “comes under the control of the Catholic institu-
tion” must follow the Directives); DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38 (explaining that if the Catholic 
institution is the “controlling party” after the collaboration, such that it manages the non-Catholic 
health care facility, then the non-Catholic facility must abide by the Directives). If a Catholic hospital 
merely partners with a non-Catholic hospital as an affiliation, but they are not part of the same corpo-
rate entity, the non-Catholic hospital does not have to automatically abide by the Directives. See 2018 
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. 
 68 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. Directive 77 gives additional 
power to the local bishop to resolve any occurrences of a Catholic organization conducting “immoral 
procedures.” Id. This new Directive could jeopardize the structural remedies that carve out reproductive 
health services post-merger, as the current arrangements could be reviewed by a local bishop under Di-
rective 77 and rescinded. See Harris Meyer, New Catholic Directives Could Complicate Mergers and 
Partnerships, MOD. HEALTHCARE (July 19, 2019), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20180719/NEWS/180719880/new-catholic-directives-could-complicate-mergers-and-partnerships 
[https://perma.cc/DKD3-EAPS] (quoting the president of the National Catholic Bioethics Center, who 
predicted that certain structural remedies that violate the Directives may be re-examined). 
 69 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. Directive 75 prohibits a varie-
ty of possible actions to create another facility, including establishing separate bylaws or procedures 
for each facility or incorporating a new legal entity. Id. Catholic bishops believe that Directive 75 
aligns with Vatican Principle 12, as “a system or institution engages in formal cooperation with evil 
by ‘setting up an administrative body’ that will oversee the provision of immoral services or by setting 
up ‘an entity such as a clinic’ that will be engaged in immoral procedures.” U.S. Bishops Revise Part 
Six of the Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 50, at 16. In previous transactions between 
Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals, local advocates and non-Catholic hospital administrators who did 
not want the community to lose access to reproductive health services would create a separate facility 
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dress the creative structural solutions, discussed in greater detail in Part II, that 
health care institutions previously employed to continue offering crucial repro-
ductive health services post-merger that are otherwise forbidden for a Catholic 
hospital.70 Although not yet tested, Directive 75 may prevent merging health 
care institutions from employing these innovative structural remedies to preserve 
access to reproductive health services.71 When combined, these new Directives 
can be understood to be a direct reaction to the increase in merger and collabora-
tive activity between Catholic and non-Catholic health care institutions.72 
B. Increasing Consolidation Between Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospitals 
The recent growth in merger and acquisition activity among Catholic and 
non-Catholic hospitals is partially attributed to the passage of the ACA in 
2010.73 This phenomenon, combined with the federal antitrust and Catholic 
Church regulatory review scheme, helps explain the decrease in reproductive 
                                                                                                                           
that did not have to abide by the Directives to provide the prohibited services post-merger. Uttley et 
al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 38 (discussing examples of separate reproductive health 
care facilities created in response to Catholic hospital mergers in New York State). These tactics are 
discussed in greater detail in Part II.A. See infra notes 158–190 and accompanying text. 
 70 See Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4 (questioning whether the model used in Troy, New 
York, would be allowed under the 2018 revised Directives). In 2011, in Troy, New York, St. Peter’s 
Health System acquired a non-Catholic hospital, Samaritan Hospital. Id.; Press Release, St. Peter’s 
Health Partners, Merger Creates St. Peter’s Health Partners; Region’s Most Comprehensive Health 
Care Provider (Oct. 3, 2011), https://news.sphp.com/news/merger-creates-st-peters-health-partners-
regions-most-comprehensive-health-care-provider/ [https://perma.cc/HLM4-3FT9]. The hospitals 
incorporated a separate, non-Catholic hospital entity on the second floor of the existing facility and 
relocated all maternity providers to the newly incorporated hospital, where post-partum sterilizations 
were performed. Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4. Reproductive health advocates and health care 
lawyers state that it is unknown if these creative solutions would withstand scrutiny under the 2018 
Directives. DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38; Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4, 7. 
 71 See DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38 (explaining that health care lawyers still cannot predict 
how the Catholic Church will assess these organizations in future Catholic hospital mergers); Penan & 
Chen, supra note 10, at 4, 6–7 (stating that because they have yet to be tested, it is still uncertain how 
the Catholic Church will implement these Directives in future transactions). 
 72 See Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that it will be important to focus on the new 
Directives as they apply to future transactions between Catholic and non-Catholic health care institu-
tions); U.S. Bishops Revise Part Six of the Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 50, at 12 (ex-
plaining that the updates to the Directives were intended to provide context and guidance for new 
transactions and affiliations between Catholic and non-Catholic institutions). An additional Directive, 
Directive 76, also speaks to collaboration in the health care industry. 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS 
DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. Directive 76 addresses Catholic hospital administrators who serve on 
the boards of non-Catholic health care institutions, stating that they must voice their disapproval of 
and withhold their authorization for “immoral procedures.” Id. Health care lawyers have noted that 
this Directive could impact the efficacy of hospital boards, but perhaps the Catholic representatives 
could recuse themselves. DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38. 
 73 See Dafny, supra note 34 (stating that there were 105 hospital merger transactions in 2012, 
after the passage of the ACA, as compared to merely fifty to sixty transactions per year prior to the 
ACA’s enactment); DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38 (crediting recent Catholic hospital mergers to 
ACA’s revisions to patient care and insurance reimbursement policies that incentivize consolidation). 
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health services across the country.74 The following Subsections discuss the im-
pact of the ACA on hospital mergers, the antitrust regulatory scheme for mer-
gers, the Catholic Church’s merger review process, and the resulting decrease 
in access to reproductive health services.75 
1. The Impact of the Affordable Care Act 
Historically, nuns ran Catholic medical facilities and focused on provid-
ing compassion and social good.76 Over the past century, however, Catholic 
health care institutions have become dominant businesses, and since the 1990s, 
Catholic hospitals have increasingly consolidated into large health care sys-
tems as part of the overall hospital merger trend occurring throughout the 
United States.77 After the passage of the ACA, hospital merger activity in the 
country grew exponentially, and Catholic hospitals partook in this trend.78 
Although individual hospital mergers occur for a variety of reasons, many 
recent hospital mergers are in direct response to the ACA.79 Following the pas-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 25 (referencing the Catholic 
Church’s role in approving a merger); CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., BALANCING ACT: CONSOLIDA-
TION AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 2 (2015), https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/12/PDF-BalancingConsolidationAntitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YQT-JUPX] (describing the 
ACA’s financial incentives and mandates for increased collaboration); HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 
ASS’N, HEALTHCARE 2020: TRANSITION TO VALUE 13 (2016), https://www.hfma.org/content/dam/
hfma/document/research_reports/PDF/49981.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JCY-CLQP] (suggesting that 
merging hospitals must show the federal antitrust agencies ways in which the merger will improve 
value in line with the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate to improve quality of care); Uttley et al., 
New York State Model, supra note 58, at 38 (emphasizing that if a non-Catholic hospital is permitted 
to continue offering reproductive health services that are outlawed by the Directives, the Catholic 
Church may not approve the deal). 
 75 See infra notes 76–153 and accompanying text. 
 76 Hafner, supra note 22; see Cohn, supra note 6 (addressing the rise of Catholic hospitals in the 
beginning of the 1900s). 
 77 See UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 7 (explaining that hospitals were merging in the 1990s to 
gain market share, which better situates them for insurance negotiations). The large hospital merger 
surge in the 1990s was motivated by concerns upon the introduction of managed care and the growth 
of HCA Healthcare, one of the largest for-profit hospital systems in the United States. Julie Creswell 
& Reed Abelson, New Laws and Rising Costs Create a Surge of Supersizing Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/business/bigger-hospitals-may-lead-to-
bigger-bills-for-patients.html [https://perma.cc/5GY2-R3LL]. In the early 2000s, the merger rate 
slowed before accelerating again in the wake of the passage of the ACA. Dafny, supra note 34; Cre-
swell & Abelson, supra; see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 
(2018) (codifying the ACA). 
 78 See Dafny, supra note 34 (calling the uptick in post-ACA mergers “impressive”); DiVarco & 
Slattery, supra note 38 (noting that Catholic hospitals have engaged in mergers and affiliations due to 
the changes in patient care and insurance reimbursement policies after the passage of the ACA, which 
encourages consolidation). 
 79 Lawrence E. Singer, Considering the ACA’s Impact on Hospital and Physician Consolidation, 
46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 913, 913–14 (2018); Creswell & Abelson, supra note 77; Sally Pipes, 
Obamacare Drives Hospital Consolidation, Raising Prices for Patients, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sallypipes/2019/09/16/obamacare-drives-hospital-consolidation-raising-
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sage of the ACA, there was significant uncertainty as health care systems at-
tempted to understand its impact on the health care marketplace.80 Hospitals 
merged to increase their market share, giving them bargaining leverage when 
negotiating with insurance companies.81 Additionally, the ACA encourages a 
variety of cost-savings measures, which are often more attainable when em-
ployed on a larger scale in conjunction with other hospitals.82 For example, the 
ACA moves away from the fee-for-service model, where insurance companies 
pay hospitals back based on the volume of services and procedures adminis-
tered.83 Instead, the ACA urges hospitals to switch to a value-based care reim-
bursement model, where insurance companies reimburse hospitals based on 
the quality of care and patient health outcomes, leaving hospitals more ac-
countable for the complete cost of patient care.84 Population health manage-
                                                                                                                           
prices-for-patients/ [https://perma.cc/J3WC-XTQ5]. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 (codi-
fying the ACA, which led to uncertainty amongst hospitals). Singer argues that “cost, uncertainty, and 
the need for essentiality” together contribute to the post-ACA mergers. Singer, supra, at 914. 
 80 Singer, supra note 79, at 914–15. The ACA proposed sweeping changes to reimbursement 
models and aimed to increase the number of Americans with health insurance coverage. Id. at 914; see 
42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 (deeming more individuals eligible for Medicare). Observers often note 
that hospitals merge out of the “bigger is better” idea, meaning that there is a conception that hospitals 
can protect themselves from uncertainty if they are larger institutions. Martin Gaynor, New Health 
Care Symposium: Consolidation and Competition in U.S. Health Care, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 1, 
2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160301.053529/full/ [https://perma.cc/
2NLR-SJ9P] (arguing that “bigger isn’t always better”); see  Singer, supra note 79, at 914 (“Manage-
ments’ response to this type of convoluted business and regulatory environment has been to consoli-
date.”). 
 81 See Dafny, supra note 34 (explaining that hospitals merged after the ACA was passed to stabi-
lize their position in the market); Creswell & Abelson, supra note 77 (noting that hospitals merged 
post-ACA to “increase their size and their negotiating clout with insurers”); Gaynor, supra note 80 
(discussing how consolidation can engender greater bargaining strength in insurance negotiations). 
 82 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 (introducing cost-savings initiatives such as reforming Medi-
care reimbursement programs); Singer, supra note 79, at 914 (explaining the benefits of cost-sharing 
across a larger hospital system). It is expensive to operate a large hospital system, as “new technology, 
treatment modalities, and pharmaceuticals” are costly, as are regulatory compliance and reporting 
rules. Singer, supra note 79, at 914. Thus, economies of scale push hospitals to merge with larger 
health care systems. Id. 
 83 Singer, supra note 79, at 914; Creswell & Abelson, supra note 77; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–
18121 (departing from the fee-for-service model). Under the fee-for-service model, doctors were paid 
based on each individual patient they served on a visit. Nat’l Inst. of Diabetes & Digestive & Kidney 
Diseases, Changing Landscape: From Fee-for-Service to Value-Based Reimbursement, U.S. DEP’T 





fee-service-value-based-reimbursement]. Because patients had to pay per visit, they may have been 
reluctant to go see a doctor for a primary care visit, minimizing the opportunity for preventative care. 
Id. 
 84 Singer, supra note 79, at 914; Creswell & Abelson, supra note 77; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o) 
(2018) (establishing a “value-based purchasing program” for hospitals under the Medicare program). 
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ment, a health care system that approaches patient well-being and health out-
comes in a holistic manner, is a vital technique for health care systems to thrive 
in a value-based reimbursement model.85 By managing overall population 
health to improve patient outcomes, hospital systems operating under a value-
based care model should receive more favorable reimbursement rates from 
insurers.86 Managing population health, however, is a daunting task, and many 
hospitals may need to merge with larger health care systems to achieve the 
necessary patient volume to allow for investment in the appropriate technolo-
gy, analytics, and resources.87 
Population health management encourages clinical integration, where dif-
ferent health care providers share patients and their health data because they 
can mutually benefit from positive health outcomes under a value-based reim-
bursement model.88 The ACA creates financial incentives for health care pro-
viders to clinically integrate such that quality of care improves and health care 
costs decrease under a value-based system.89 Many hospitals seek to merge 
                                                                                                                           
Value-based care models aim to account for patient health outcomes when insurance plans reimburse 
health care providers. Nat’l Inst. of Diabetes & Digestive & Kidney Diseases, supra note 83. Rather 
than using a fee-for-service model, which reimburses doctors for service regardless of outcome, value-
based care may reimburse providers at different rates based on both healthcare quality and cost fac-
tors. Id. Fee-for-service models, however, remain common as the U.S. healthcare market struggles to 
switch reimbursement models, so hospitals continue to use both systems. Singer, supra note 79, at 
914–15. This uncertainty has also encouraged hospital mergers to better manage both models. Id. 
 85 STEVE BURRILL & ARIELLE KANE, DELOITTE 2017 SURVEY OF US HEALTH SYSTEM CEOS 2 
(2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/life-sciences-health-care/us-
lshc-ceo-medicaid-reimbursement.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2GY-C6P4]. Population health management 
allows health care systems to use both preventative and acute medical care to advance the overall 
health of its patient population. Id. 
 86 Id. If patients are generally healthier because their providers work together to deliver quality 
health care that boosts patient health outcomes, it benefits the health care systems under a value-based 
reimbursement model, as they will receive more favorable insurance reimbursement rates. Id.; Cre-
swell & Abelson, supra note 77. 
 87 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 74, at 12; MONICA NOETHER & SEAN MAY, 
CHARLES RIVER ASSOCS., HOSPITAL MERGER BENEFITS: VIEWS FROM HOSPITAL LEADERS AND 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 3 (Jan. 2017), https://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/
Hospital-Merger-Full-Report-_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MKJ3-KQEF]. For example, hospitals 
need to invest in expensive electronic health records systems to track patient data and outcomes. NO-
ETHER & MAY, supra. Furthermore, to truly manage a population’s overall health, hospital systems 
need to offer walk in clinics, nutritionists, and other costly services. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, 
supra note 74, at 12. If a hospital does not have enough patients, it is not financially prudent to invest 
in these resources. Id. Thus, it needs to consolidate with other hospital systems to increase its patient 
population and justify these investments based on economies of scale. Id. at 12–13; NOETHER & MAY, 
supra. 
 88 CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 74, at 2, 5. The ACA incentivizes providers to coordi-
nate in the care that they deliver to patients, with the goal of lowering health care costs and improving 
the quality of care that patients receive. Id. 
 89 Id. at 2; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o) (discussing the calculation process for value-based incen-
tive payments based on hospital quality and performance). 
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with other health care providers to achieve such clinical integration.90 The 
ACA’s impact on reimbursement models and clinical integration incentives is 
a substantial contributing factor to the recent increase in health care system 
mergers across the country, including those involving Catholic hospitals.91 
2. Antitrust Regulatory Review 
When a hospital or health care system, Catholic or non-Catholic, is in-
volved in a merger or acquisition, it often needs to receive approval from fed-
eral antitrust regulatory agencies, as well as occasionally from state regulatory 
bodies.92 Large transactions that satisfy certain threshold requirements under 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) must file notice of the transaction with the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) before 
closing the deal.93 These agencies have thirty days to review the transaction, 
and then they will either approve the deal or issue a Second Request for addi-
tional documents and information, which enables the agencies to conduct a 
more thorough investigation for possible antitrust violations.94 
                                                                                                                           
 90 CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 74, at 5; Singer, supra note 79, at 914. Although 
health care providers can engage in affiliations and networks to coordinate care and achieve clinical 
integration, some merge to attain the benefits of clinical integration as well as the economies of scale 
to invest in the other technology and resources required for value-based care. CAL. HEALTHCARE 
FOUND., supra note 74, at 5. A merger is not needed to realize clinical integration, however, and it can 
be considered anticompetitive under the antitrust laws if it merely increases market power without 
promoting quality of care and lowering health care costs. See id. (discussing the need to avoid a con-
solidation of market power). Even as hospitals cite integration goals when merging, economic experts 
suggest that hospital consolidation does not immediately result in integration, and it is very difficult to 
achieve quality and cost-savings benefits by integrating, indicating a possible gap in hospitals’ reason-
ing when conducting mergers. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 74, at 13 (quoting Dr. 
Leemore Dafny, explaining that mergers do not usually result in lower costs for consumers); Gaynor, 
supra note 80 (“Merely changing ownership via consolidation does not imply integration.”). 
 91 See DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38 (noting that Catholic hospitals have engaged in mergers 
and affiliations due to the changes in patient care and insurance reimbursement policies after the pas-
sage of the ACA, which encourages consolidation). See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121. 
 92 Alexis J. Gilman et al., Healthcare Providers and Insurers: FTC Approach to Provider Mer-
gers and Acquisitions, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-
practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/posts/healthcare-providers-and-insurers-ftc-approach-to-provider-
mergers-and-acquisitions [https://perma.cc/V9JL-QZXW]. Section 7 of the Clayton Act outlaws mer-
gers if “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 
(2018). The Department of Justice (DOJ) and FTC are the federal agencies tasked with enforcing the 
antitrust laws, including the Clayton Act. Id.; Gilman et al., supra. 
 93 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2018) (listing the pre-merger notification filing requirements); Gilman et al., 
supra note 92. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) is contained in Section 7A of the Clayton Act, and it 
requires transactions worth over two hundred million dollars be reported to the antitrust agencies, and 
the parties must wait thirty days after filing the pre-merger notification to close the transaction. 15 
U.S.C. § 18a(a)–(b); Gilman et al., supra note 92. The purpose of an HSR filing is to alert the federal 
antitrust agencies of a transaction that may present anticompetitive concerns, so they can preemptively 
investigate before the deal closes. Gilman et al., supra note 92. 
 94 15 U.S.C. § 18a; Gilman et al., supra note 92. After reviewing the HSR file during the thirty-
day waiting period, FTC staff may clear the deal by allowing the waiting period to expire or by termi-
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Mergers are typically reviewed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which 
prohibits mergers that result in a reduction in competition.95 When investigat-
ing a hospital merger for antitrust concerns, the FTC conducts a “fact-specific 
process,” using the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Guidelines) to inform its 
analysis.96 The FTC and DOJ issue the Guidelines jointly, most recently in 
2010, and the Guidelines explain the agencies’ evaluation and enforcement 
policies with respect to mergers.97 Although the Guidelines are a policy state-
ment, not law, both federal agencies and courts look to them when evaluating 
the potential anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger, and thus they are 
helpful guidance for merging parties to predict how a transaction may be eval-
uated.98 In particular, the Guidelines focus on transactions that could result in 
increased market power and consumer harm.99 Although price increases are the 
                                                                                                                           
nating the waiting period early, referred to as Early Termination. FED. TRADE COMM’N, Premerger 
Notification and the Merger Review Process, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/
guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/premerger-notification-merger-review [https://perma.cc/K6WT-BCLX]. 
If the transaction presents anticompetitive concerns, FTC staff will issue a Request for Additional 
Information, commonly referred to as a Second Request, which is essentially an investigatory subpoe-
na that asks for documents, data, and informational interviews from the merging parties. Id. 
 95 15 U.S.C. § 18; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 1 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]; Gilman et al., supra note 92. 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act specifically makes unlawful mergers “in any line of commerce or in any 
activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 96 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Guide-
lines), most recently updated in 2010, are promulgated jointly by the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Divi-
sion and act as a policy statement on the analysis that the antitrust agencies use to evaluate a proposed 
transaction. Id. Although the FTC and DOJ share antitrust enforcement authority, the FTC’s Mergers 
IV division has been responsible for investigating hospital mergers since the 1990s. Gilman et al., 
supra note 92; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SER-
VICES AND PRODUCTS 1 & n.1, 2 (2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-
policy-guidance/overview_health_care_june_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE6R-HEBB] (noting that 
Mergers IV primarily investigates hospital and health care provider mergers). In the 1990s, the anti-
trust agencies sued to block seven hospital merger lawsuits and lost every one. Gilman et al., supra 
note 92. As a result, the FTC put together a task force to review its health care provider merger analy-
sis. Id. The FTC has consistently prevailed in hospital merger litigations in the past decade. Id. 
 97 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95. The Guidelines describe the various types 
of evidence and analytical processes that the agencies use when reviewing a proposed transaction. Id. 
 98 Id.; Gilman et al., supra note 92. The Guidelines are intended to provide insight into the agen-
cies’ antitrust analysis for the commercial world and the antitrust lawyers that represent them. HORI-
ZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95. They are also helpful for the courts in evaluating anti-
trust cases that the agencies may bring to block a proposed transaction, and courts cite them as author-
ity in opinions. Id.; Gilman et al., supra note 92. The Guidelines emphasize that they are merely a 
variety of tools, however, and not an exhaustive list of analyses. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 
supra note 95. 
 99 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95,  at 2. The Guidelines emphasize that mar-
ket power is the “unifying theme” of the Guidelines in their entirety. Id. A transaction can result in an 
increase in market power if the combined firms can “raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, 
or otherwise harm consumers.” Id. Minimizing competition in the relevant market is a way for the 
merging parties to enhance their market power, and thus it is an area of concern under antitrust law. 
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clearest evidence of consumer harm, the agencies typically examine price and 
non-price competition when examining a hospital merger for antitrust viola-
tions.100 Because hospitals operate in a two-sided market, they compete first on 
price when negotiating reimbursement rates with health insurance companies, 
before competing on non-price factors like quality, location, and service offer-
ings to attract patients.101 
To evaluate the potential anticompetitive effects of a merger or acquisi-
tion, the FTC often, but not always, begins with the market definition.102 Mar-
ket definition analysis helps agencies understand both the possible product 
market and the geographic market where a post-merger reduction in competi-
tion could harm consumers.103 The product market is defined by the group of 
products that have a function or use so similar that they can act as substitutes, 
which different entities compete to sell to consumers.104 When defining the 
product market in a hospital merger, the agencies often examine the inpatient 
general acute care (GAC) services offered by the hospital.105 The geographic 
                                                                                                                           
Id. The dominant standard for evaluating potentially anticompetitive mergers is consumer welfare. 
Christine Wilson, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the George Mason Law Review 
Symposium: Welfare Standards Underlying Antitrust Enforcement: What You Measure Is What You 
Get 1 (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1455663/
welfare_standard_speech_-_cmr-wilson.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PW5-4C75]. If the transaction could 
harm consumers, presumably by an increase in market power, the transaction may violate the antitrust 
laws. Id. 
 100 Wilson, supra note 99, at 5–6. The Guidelines state that “[f]or simplicity of exposition,” they 
discuss market power and merger analysis through a price effects lens. HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 2. They note that an increase in market power can be observed through 
non-price effects which also harm consumers. Id. Non-price increases in market power can include a 
reduction in services or products. Id. 
 101 FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 470–71 (7th Cir. 2016); Gregory Vist-
nes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2000); Wilson, 
supra note 99, at 6. Hospitals compete in two stages, and thus, the antitrust agencies often analyze 
anticompetitive effects on both price and non-price factors. Wilson, supra note 99, at 6. 
 102 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 7. Defining a market assists agency 
staff by enabling them to focus on a set of products in a certain area that may suffer from anticompeti-
tive effects post-merger. See id. at 7–8 (explaining that agencies often first define the market broadly 
to understand which products compete in that region, before narrowing in on a specific product mar-
ket). Antitrust cases often turn on how the relevant market is defined, because it establishes the 
amount of control firms have over their pricing. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 
U.S. 377, 403 (1956) (holding that the relevant market for E.I. du Pont’s (du Pont) cellophane product 
was not cellophane, but rather, flexible packaging materials, and thus, du Pont did not illegally mo-
nopolize the market per the antitrust laws). 
 103 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 7. 
 104 Id. at 8; Gilman et al., supra note 92; see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325, 
336 (1962) (defining the relevant product markets in a merger between shoe manufacturers as “men’s, 
women’s and children’s shoes”). 
 105 Gilman et al., supra note 92. Of course, not all inpatient hospital services are substitutes for 
each other, and different services could constitute several smaller product markets. Id. Despite this, 
the FTC typically uses a “cluster market” containing all general acute care (GAC) services in hospital 
mergers, as it is more feasible to analyze the competitive effects using one product market. Jonathan 
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market is the region that would suffer from a reduction in competition, espe-
cially if consumers are unable to travel to replace the relevant products.106 In a 
hospital merger, determining the geographic market that the merging hospitals 
serve can be challenging, and it often turns on case-specific facts.107 Addition-
ally, the agencies use this market definition to calculate the merging parties’ 
market concentration and market share to determine if the potential merger 
raises competitive concerns.108 
                                                                                                                           
Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 157, 158 (2007) (noting 
that it is “a matter of analytical convenience”); Gilman et al., supra note 92. GAC services broadly 
include emergency, internal medicine, and surgical procedures, but they do not encompass complex 
specialty services. FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1075–76 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
Courts usually accept the GAC cluster market when reviewing the agencies’ challenges to hospital 
mergers. See, e.g., id. (applying the GAC cluster market); FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 33434, at *146 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (same); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 
1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (same). 
 106 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 13. The geographic market focuses on 
the region in which a supplier of products is located, as well as the consumers’ location. Id. Both 
“consumers’ ability and willingness” to travel are important factors when defining a geographic mar-
ket. Id. Once the agencies define a product market containing a certain product sold by one of the 
merging parties and its substitutes, it uses the hypothetical monopolist test as a check to verify if these 
products are indeed “reasonably interchangeable” within a certain geographic market. Id. at 8–9. The 
test imagines that a hypothetical monopolist would implement a “small but significant and non-
transitory increase in price (SSNIP)” on the chosen product. Id. If the hypothetical monopolist test and 
SSNIP impact the price of sales of similar products in the relevant geographic market, such that the 
price is higher than “competitive levels,” it could indicate the possibility of a price increase post-
merger. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d at 468; see HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 
supra note 95, at 8–10 (providing examples of how the agencies employ the hypothetical monopolist 
test). The FTC performs the SSNIP test in an “iterative” manner and repeats the test by adding differ-
ent customers and suppliers to confirm the geographic market. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 
F.3d at 468. 
 107 Gilman et al., supra note 92 (explaining that the geographic market is “often one of the most 
difficult and contested issues in a provider-merger investigation and litigation”). Hospital merger 
geographic markets are often quite small because patients tend to travel to their closest hospital for 
services. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d at 470. Furthermore, because hospitals operate in a 
unique two-stage competition model, where they compete on price with insurance providers and on 
non-price factors like quality of care with patients, the geographic market analysis differs from other 
competitive markets. Id. at 470–71; Vistnes, supra note 101. 
 108 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 18. Agencies consider the merging 
firms’ market shares pre- and post-merger to measure their market concentration. Id. A highly concen-
trated market is more likely to present anticompetitive concerns. Id. at 18–19. The Supreme Court 
held in United States v. Philadelphia. National Bank in 1963 that a combined 33% market share is a 
competitive harm under the antitrust laws, and the FTC continues to abide by this presumption. 374 
U.S. 321, 365 (1963); Gilman et al., supra note 92. To measure market concentration, the agencies use 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which requires “summing the squares of the individual firms’ 
market shares,” resulting in significantly more HHI for firms with greater market share. HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 18. Typically, HHI can be classified into three markets: “Un-
concentrated Markets: HHI below 1500,” “Moderately Concentrated Markets: HHI between 1500 and 
2500,” and “Highly Concentrated Markets: “HHI above 2500.” Id. at 19. Highly concentrated markets 
raise the presumption of increased market power post-merger. Id. 
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The agencies also focus on evidence of adverse competitive effects that 
could potentially result from the transaction, which includes market share and 
concentration.109 This also includes the historical precedent of similar mergers 
that resulted in less competition and price increases, and examples of “head-to-
head competition” between the merging parties.110 In addition, the Guidelines 
instruct the agencies to study the possible unilateral effects of a transaction—
the impact the elimination of competition between just the merging parties 
could have upon overall competition in the market.111 A merger could also re-
sult in coordinated effects, by encouraging other parties in the market to alter 
their conduct in such a way that results in a loss of competition.112 
Merging parties may assert defenses to antitrust scrutiny and litigation.113 
The Guidelines encourage the agencies to consider the ease of entry for anoth-
er firm to join the market and provide the competition that would otherwise be 
lost as a result of the merger.114 In a hospital merger, this is often difficult for 
the hospitals to prove, as hospitals are large, expensive institutions that cannot 
easily enter an established health care market.115 The Guidelines also discuss 
                                                                                                                           
 109 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 2–3. The FTC and DOJ will examine 
any evidence that details the probable anticompetitive effects of a transaction. Id. at 2. 
 110 Id. at 3. Here, the Guidelines list a variety of examples of evidence of adverse competitive 
effects that could occur post-merger. Id. “Head-to-head” competition occurs when two parties com-
pete directly with each other. Id. at 3. For example, in Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc. in 
2016, the district court found that defendants Staples and Office Depot consistently engaged in head-
to-head competition for large business-to-business customers, and an elimination of this behavior 
could lessen competition in the market. 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 131 (D.D.C. 2016). Thus, the court 
granted the agency’s preliminary injunction blocking the proposed merger. Id. at 138. 
 111 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 20. Unilateral effects may be most 
obvious in a transaction where the merging parties will combine to form a monopoly in the relevant 
market. Id. They can also be readily noticeable, however, if the merging parties are engaged in “head-
to-head competition.” Id. at 3. Unilateral effects can harm consumers in several ways, including dif-
ferential product pricing, bargaining between supplier and consumer, and reduced innovation as a 
result of a lack of competition. Id. at 20–24. 
 112 Id. at 24. Coordinated effects refers to the post-merger phenomenon where the remaining firms 
in the relevant market are incentivized to coordinate or collude. Id. at 24–26. 
 113 Gilman et al., supra note 92. Commonly raised defenses include future entry by another com-
petitor, efficiencies as a result of the merger, failing firm (i.e., the firm must merge with a competitor 
or it will fail), state action immunity, and safe harbor provisions. Id. 
 114 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 27–28. In evaluating ease of entry, the 
agencies analyze three factors: timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency. Id. at 29. First, the new firm 
must enter the relevant market soon after the merger to counteract any anticompetitive effects. Id. 
Second, it is likely another firm would enter the market if it would be lucrative for that firm to do so. 
Id. Third, the new entrant to the market must sufficiently combat the agencies’ antitrust concerns. Id. 
 115 Gilman et al., supra note 92. A new hospital entering the market is rarely timely, because the 
facility must be built and physicians acquired, and state and local regulatory requirements for health 
care providers can be significant hurdles. Id. Additionally, some states have a Certificate of Need law, 
requiring new health care providers to get approval from state regulators confirming that there is suf-
ficient need for a hospital before entering the market. Id. 
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efficiencies, a common defense for mergers undergoing antitrust scrutiny.116 
Although efficiencies can promote competition, agencies only allow them as a 
defense to merger scrutiny if they are (1) merger-specific, meaning that the 
parties could not achieve them but for the merger, (2) verifiable, and (3) not a 
result of anticompetitive behavior.117 Efficiency claims are also fact-specific, 
and the merging parties must provide specific projections to substantiate 
them.118 In hospital mergers, efficiency claims are often framed in the context 
of the ACA’s cost-savings incentives for achieving clinical integration between 
health care systems and different providers.119 
Despite the potential need for antitrust review, many small hospital and 
provider mergers do not meet the HSR threshold value, so they do not have to 
file a pre-merger notification with the DOJ and FTC.120 Because these smaller 
hospital merger transactions are non-reportable under the HSR Act, the FTC is 
not obligated to investigate them for antitrust concerns, but it can choose to do 
                                                                                                                           
 116 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 29. Merging parties often justify their 
merger by claiming efficiencies they can achieve as a result of the transaction. Id. Lower courts have 
accepted an efficiencies defense in merger litigation, with the caveat that the efficiencies must be 
sufficient to overcome the anticompetitive harm of a merger. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 
708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that “the trend among lower courts is to recognize the defense”); 
FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054–55 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that the district court 
should have considered the merging hospitals’ efficiencies defense, as the two hospitals combined 
could provide higher quality service and attract better doctors). 
 117 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 30. Merging parties may claim efficien-
cies, but if one of the parties can achieve these efficiencies but for the merger, they are not merger-
specific, and the agencies likely will not consider them to be an acceptable defense to an otherwise 
anticompetitive merger. See H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 721–22; HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 
supra note 95, at 30. For example, in H.J. Heinz Co., the court blocked the merger of two baby food 
manufacturers, holding that H.J. Heinz Co.’s (Heinz’s) efficiencies defense—that it could create a 
better product by acquiring Beech-Nut’s recipes—was not merger-specific because Heinz could de-
velop better recipes on its own without the merger. 246 F.3d at 722. 
 118 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 30. Efficiencies are inherently specula-
tive, and often cannot be verified by the agencies, especially if the merging parties are reluctant to 
share competitive information. See id. (“[M]uch of the information relating to efficiencies is uniquely 
in the possession of the merging firms.”) Agencies do not accept ambiguous claims of efficiencies. Id. 
In contrast, agencies will accept cognizable efficiencies, which are merger-specific and are not anti-
competitive in nature. Id. 
 119 See Dafny, supra note 34 (discussing the effect of the ACA on hospital mergers intended to 
achieve efficiencies); Gilman et al., supra note 92 (explaining that health care systems often merge for 
efficiencies reasons including population health management). For example, in Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, the merging hospitals argued that a merger would 
allow them to engage in risk-based contracting, an alternative to fee-for-service, where the provider 
takes on more of the risk and upside in health care costs. 838 F.3d 327, 350–51 (3d Cir. 2016). The 
parties alleged that this was an efficiency, as a larger hospital system would enable them to spread out 
the costs associated with risk-based contracting. Id. at 351. The Third Circuit, however, held that this 
was not a cognizable efficiency and blocked the merger, as it was unclear how the consumers would 
benefit and how it would offset any anticompetitive harms of the merger. Id. 
 120 Gilman et al., supra note 92; see 15 U.S.C. § 18a (providing the necessary threshold amounts). 
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so.121 Although these transactions are non-reportable, they do not always avoid 
federal antitrust scrutiny, as consumers, state attorneys general, and other third 
parties may bring their concerns about a proposed merger to the agencies, who 
can investigate it for anticompetitive effects under the Guidelines analysis de-
scribed above.122 The FTC may work in conjunction with the antitrust divi-
sions in state attorneys general offices to investigate the proposed transaction if 
state officials are concerned.123 Both the FTC and state attorneys general are 
authorized to block the transaction or require a divestiture.124 
Additionally, some rural hospital mergers are immune from antitrust scru-
tiny.125 In 1996, the antitrust agencies outlined a “safety zone” for mergers be-
tween certain small general acute care hospitals.126 If one of the merging hos-
pitals contains less than one hundred licensed beds and cares for fewer than 
forty patients per day, the antitrust agencies will not interfere in the merger, 
“absent extraordinary circumstances.”127 The agencies state that these mergers 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Gilman et al., supra note 92. Even though smaller, non-reportable hospitals mergers do not 
have to be reported to the FTC under the HSR Act, it can be advisable to inform the antitrust agencies 
of the transaction if the merging parties’ attorneys are concerned about the agencies investigating the 
merger after it is consummated. Id. 
 122 Id. Although the FTC is not required to review non-reportable mergers, it may still investigate 
the merger if there are complaints from the community. Id. 
 123 Brijesh Dave, Trust the (Local) Process: Advantages State Attorneys General Enjoy in Merger 
Review, A.B.A. TYL (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/
tyl/topics/antitrust/trust-local-process-advantages-state-attorneys-general-enjoy-merger-review/ [https://
perma.cc/GRC4-HSEP]. Federal antitrust agencies and state attorneys general have similar investiga-
tory structures and powers with respect to merger review. Id. 
 124 Id.; Gilman et al., supra note 92. Although the FTC and DOJ are authorized to investigate and 
block anticompetitive transactions under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, state attorneys general can also 
sue merging parties under parens patriae. 15 U.S.C. § 18; Dave, supra note 123. The HSR Act, which 
established pre-merger notification filing requirements when it was enacted in 1976, also gave state 
attorneys general the right to litigate antitrust suits under the Clayton Act through the parens patriae 
doctrine. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2018). Parens patriae enables a state to act on behalf of “natural persons” 
in the state. Id.; Dave, supra note 123. 
 125 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 8–9 (1996) [hereinafter STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLI-
CY IN HEALTH CARE]; Gilman et al., supra note 92. 
 126 STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 125; Gil-
man et al., supra note 92. Although these statements are several decades old, the antitrust agencies 
continue to apply them. Gilman et al., supra note 92. 
 127 STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 125. Two 
conditions must be met: one of the hospitals must have “an average of fewer than [one hundred] li-
censed beds over the three most recent years, and . . . an average daily inpatient census of fewer than 
[forty] patients over the three most recent years.” Id. If these conditions are met, the merger will not 
be challenged, “absent extraordinary circumstances.” Id. Also, the safety zone does not pertain to 
hospitals built within the past five years. Id. at 9. The safety zone does not include specialty hospitals 
either. Gilman et al., supra note 92. 
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may be procompetitive, as rural hospitals can benefit from merging with a 
larger hospital system and realize efficiencies.128 
3. Catholic Hospital Merger Review Process 
When a Catholic hospital is involved in a merger or acquisition, there is an 
additional step of scrutiny before the deal can close, as the local bishop, and oc-
casionally the Vatican, must approve the deal.129 Directive 68 authorizes the 
governing bishop to approve or deny health care collaborations within a dio-
cese.130 The Directives instruct the local bishops to contemplate the broader con-
sequences of approving a health care collaboration involving Catholic institu-
tions on both a regional and national level.131 Additionally, Directive 69 states 
that if the transaction spans several dioceses, the bishop in each affected dio-
cese must approve the collaboration before the merger can close.132 In particu-
                                                                                                                           
 128 STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 125, at 9. 
Presumably, if a merging hospital with fewer than one hundred beds was the only hospital in the rural 
area, a merger with a larger health care system would not result in a loss in competition, as it would 
not be competing with another hospital to begin with. See id. (explaining that the rural hospital that is 
the only hospital in the market is unlikely to compete with other hospitals). 
 129 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 25; Melanie Evans, Is This Hos-
pital Takeover Permitted? Ask the Catholic Church, WALL STREET J. (May 14, 2018), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/is-this-hospital-takeover-permitted-ask-the-catholic-church-1526290201 [https://
perma.cc/3TY4-D4S6]. A bishop is an “ecclesiastical dignitary” who is the governing authority for a 
specific diocese. Bishop, NEW ADVENT CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/02581b.htm [https://perma.cc/NL52-2GA6]. 
 130 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 25. The local bishop has com-
plete authority to evaluate and approve collaborations between Catholic and non-Catholic health care 
providers within his diocese. Id. A diocese is a certain geographic area containing churches and other 
Catholic facilities, including hospitals, under a bishop’s authority. Diocese, NEW ADVENT CATHOLIC 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05001a.htm [https://perma.cc/N5GJ-YA6R]. 
 131 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 25. Directive 67 grants this “ul-
timate responsibility” to the local bishop of each diocese, but commands him to consider not only the 
impact on his diocese, but the possible effects of his decision on the region and nation as well. Id. In 
making this decision, the local bishop should consider factors such as whether the transaction would 
“involve wrongful cooperation, give scandal, or undermine the Church’s witness.” Id. Directives 67 
and 71 both address the issue of avoiding scandal, a word that was used in earlier versions of the Di-
rectives as well when referring to immoral procedures such as abortion. Id. The Catholic Church de-
fines scandal as “an attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil.” Catechism of the Catholic 
Church § 2284, LIBRERIA EDITRICE VATICANA, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P80.HTM 
[https://perma.cc/8W7D-7KCQ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). 
 132 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 25. Furthermore, the bishop in 
the diocese where the health care institution’s headquarters is located is responsible for collaborating 
with bishops in other affected dioceses. Id. The requirement to coordinate with the bishop governing 
the hospital’s corporate headquarters was a new addition to the 2018 Directives. DiVarco & Slattery, 
supra note 38. Health care lawyers warn that this additional coordination may result in lengthier trans-
actions because many health care systems span the United States. Id. 
2620 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2595 
larly large or complicated transactions, if the bishops cannot come to an 
agreement, they must seek guidance from the Vatican.133 
Even if a transaction withstands antitrust scrutiny, it can fall apart if one of 
the merging parties does not agree to abide by the Directives.134 An agreement to 
abide by the Directives is a precondition for the merger.135 Without a negotiated 
understanding to adhere to the Directives, the local bishop will likely block the 
transaction from proceeding.136 Thus, in order to ensure that a transaction in-
volving a Catholic hospital can proceed without encountering barriers from the 
Catholic Church, merging parties are incentivized to agree to comply with the 
Directives early in the process.137 
4. The Resulting Decrease in Access to Reproductive Services 
ACA incentives for clinical integration between health care providers and 
the expectation that a non-Catholic hospital must agree to abide by the Direc-
tives to merge with a Catholic hospital have contributed to a reduction in re-
productive health services across the country, especially in rural areas where 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Evans, supra note 129. For example, in 2018, Catholic Health Initiatives and Dignity Health 
proposed a $28 billion merger that would combine 139 hospitals across twenty-eight states, and the 
Archbishop of Denver sought review from the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 
Tara Bannow & Harris Meyer, CHI-Dignity Merger Cleared by Vatican, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Oct. 
16, 2018), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181016/NEWS/181019911/chi-dignity-
merger-cleared-by-vatican [https://perma.cc/5FGZ-SDZF]; Evans, supra note 129. The Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith is a group of bishops, cardinals, and other religious leaders in the Vatican 
who resolve issues concerning Catholic doctrine and theology. Evans, supra note 129. Catholic Health 
Initiatives and Dignity Health received moral analyses from four ethicists before seeking additional 
guidance from the Vatican. Bannow & Meyer, supra. The Vatican ultimately approved the transac-
tion, but the Vatican has challenged Catholic hospital mergers in the past. Id.; see Evans, supra note 
129 (discussing a 2012 transaction in St. Louis involving the sale of a Catholic hospital owned by 
Mercy to a non-Catholic company, which fell apart due to challenges in receiving Vatican and FTC 
approval). 
 134 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58 (explaining that if a non-Catholic hospital 
is permitted to continue offering procedures outlawed by the Directives, the local bishop may not 
approve the deal). 
 135 Martin, Catholic Bishops Vote to Revise Rules, supra note 57. 
 136 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58; see 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DI-
RECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26 (stating in Directive 74 that any acquired facility must observe the Di-
rectives). Directive 74 emphasizes that any hospital that is acquired by a Catholic facility during the 
transaction must abide by the Directives, and Directive 67 reiterates that the local bishop must evalu-
ate if a transaction within his diocese will “involve wrongful cooperation, give scandal, or undermine 
the Church’s witness.” 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 25–26. 
 137 See Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58 (discussing how future compliance 
with the Directives is often a crucial issue during merger negotiations between Catholic and non-
Catholic health care institutions); Hafner, supra note 22 (noting that about thirty non-Catholic hospi-
tals involved in mergers with Catholic hospitals have agreed to comply with “some or all” of the Di-
rectives). 
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there are less hospitals and those hospitals tend to be Catholic.138 When a 
Catholic hospital combines with a non-Catholic hospital, the non-Catholic 
hospital must adopt the Directives to gain approval from the local bishop, but 
it also needs to standardize its medical procedure offerings with the Catholic 
hospital to achieve clinical integration.139 
Clinical integration between different health care providers, which ena-
bles providers to collaborate to provide high quality care to patients, is a key 
goal of hospital mergers for several reasons.140 First, as discussed above, the 
ACA developed financial incentives for hospital systems that engage in clini-
cal integration programs.141 Second, real clinical integration that improves the 
quality of health care and lowers costs will be viewed more favorably by anti-
trust regulators who are concerned about mergers that concentrate market 
share.142 The ACA’s incentives encourage hospitals to combine to clinically 
integrate, but a consolidation in market power may violate antitrust law.143 
Consequently, in order to pass antitrust scrutiny, merging hospitals must 
                                                                                                                           
 138 42 U.S.C. § 18001; see 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 25 (ref-
erencing the local bishop’s role in approving a transaction); CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 
74, at 2 (describing the ACA’s financial incentives and mandates for increased collaboration); Uttley 
et al., New York State Model, supra note 58 (explaining that if a non-Catholic hospital is permitted to 
continue offering reproductive health services that are outlawed by the Directives, the local bishop 
may not approve the deal). 
 139 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58 (explaining that if a non-Catholic hospital 
is permitted to continue offering reproductive health services that are outlawed by the Directives, the 
local bishop may not approve the deal); Elizabeth B. Deutsch, Note, Expanding Conscience, Shrinking 
Care: The Crisis in Access to Reproductive Care and the Affordable Care Act’s Nondiscrimination 
Mandate, 124 YALE L.J. 2470, 2486–87 (2015) (discussing how clinical integration and FTC antitrust 
review policy force non-Catholic hospitals to adopt the Directives). Post-merger, it is crucially im-
portant for health care systems to adapt to a common, unified culture. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 
87, at 12. To achieve this “common culture,” the merging hospitals need to both financially and clini-
cally integrate, such that they share similar values. Id. 
 140 Gaynor, supra note 80 (explaining that true integration is necessary to achieve cost savings 
and other positive results from a transaction). 
 141 42 U.S.C. § 18001; CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 74, at 2 (describing the ACA’s 
financial incentives and mandates for increased collaboration, including “[b]undled [p]ayment,” ac-
countable care organizations, and “[p]atient-[c]entered [m]edical [h]omes”). The ACA intended for 
different health care providers to work together to coordinate all of a patient’s care, with the goal of 
improving quality of care and bettering patient health outcomes. CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra 
note 74, at 2. 
 142 CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 74, at 5 (noting that merging hospitals should have 
legitimate reasons that they need to merge rather than affiliate to achieve clinical integration); 
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 74, at 13 (suggesting that merging hospitals must show 
antitrust agencies ways in which the merger will improve value by improving the quality of care and 
lowering health care costs for patients and the community). Hospitals and health systems need to 
ensure that their clinical integration plans are merger-specific, meaning that they could not be 
achieved but for the merger. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 87, at 10. 
 143 42 U.S.C. § 18001; CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 74, at 1 (referencing the compli-
cated interaction between the ACA’s integration goals and the role of antitrust regulators). 
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demonstrate genuine, necessary clinical integration.144 This incentivizes merg-
ing parties to fully integrate, which includes adoption of the Directives, so that 
the merging parties offer the same set of medical procedures and services.145 
Thus, adopting the Directives to achieve clinical integration may facilitate a 
more favorable antitrust review, and it will also lead to a greater likelihood of 
the merger receiving the blessing of the Catholic Church.146 
As more hospitals in the country become Catholic, the number of hospi-
tals offering reproductive health services decreases.147 These trends are espe-
cially notable in rural areas, where a Catholic hospital may be the only hospital 
in the region.148 In 2016, there were forty-six Catholic “sole community hospi-
tals” in the country, which the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
defines as being “located more than [thirty-five] miles from other like hospi-
tals.”149 In these rural areas where Catholic hospitals are the only hospitals, 
patients are without another provider to turn to if they need a procedure that is 
banned by the Directives.150 In the event of a medical emergency, such as a 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 74, at 5 (listing questions about integration that 
merging hospitals should consider in the context of an antitrust review); Gaynor, supra note 80 (ex-
plaining that hospitals need to truly integrate their clinical programs to gain the quality of care and 
cost reduction benefits of integration, while noting that this is incredibly difficult to achieve). 
 145 Deutsch, supra note 139 (drawing a connection between clinically integrating to survive anti-
trust scrutiny with adopting the Directives). 
 146 See 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 25 (referencing the local 
bishop’s role in approving a transaction); CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., supra note 74, at 2 (describing 
the ACA’s financial incentives and mandates for increased collaboration); Uttley et al., New York 
State Model, supra note 58 (explaining that if a non-Catholic hospital is permitted to continue offering 
reproductive health services that are outlawed by the Directives, the local bishop may not approve the 
deal). 
 147 See Hafner, supra note 22 (noting that about thirty non-Catholic hospitals involved in recent 
mergers with Catholic hospitals have agreed to comply with “some or all” of the Directives). 
 148 KAYE ET AL., supra note 24, at 24; UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5–6. In fact, this 
was a significant issue in the proposed transaction between Sierra Vista Regional Health Center, 
where Dr. Holder worked, and Carondelet Health Network, a Catholic hospital system. See Affidavit 
of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 1; Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, supra note 1; supra notes 1–
21 and accompanying text. Sierra Vista is a rural community in Arizona, and the closest hospital was 
eighty miles away in Tucson. See Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra note 1, at 1; Religion & Eth-
ics Newsweekly, supra note 1; supra notes 1–21 and accompanying text. Thus, when Dr. Holder’s 
patient suffered a miscarriage and needed to terminate the second twin fetus, she had to be transferred 
eighty miles to the closest facility, putting her health at risk. See Affidavit of Dr. Robert Holder, supra 
note 1, at 3; Cohn, supra note 6; supra notes 1–21 and accompanying text. 
 149 See 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 (2019) (defining the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ 
“[c]riteria for classification as a sole community hospital”); UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5–
6 (listing the number of Catholic sole community hospitals in the United States). In Iowa, South Da-
kota, and Texas, multiple different geographic regions of the state have only one Catholic hospital as a 
provider. UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5–6. 
 150 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 24, at 24 (giving examples of patients in rural areas whose only 
hospital was Catholic); UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5–6 (listing the sole community hospi-
tals in the United States that are Catholic); Natalie Langlois, Note, Life-Sustaining Treatment Law: A 
Model for Balancing a Woman’s Reproductive Rights with a Pharmacist’s Conscientious Objection, 
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miscarriage, individuals living near Catholic sole community hospitals have no 
choice other than the hospital closest to them, even if it cannot provide the 
necessary medical care.151 In summation, a wide variety of factors—including 
the passage of the ACA, the financial state of hospitals, the uptick in merger 
activity, and the revised Directives—have converged over the past decade to 
create a decrease in access to reproductive health services across the coun-
try.152 The following Part will provide examples of creative structure remedies 
that attempt to combat the reduction in access to reproductive health care and 
the new Directives that threaten these solutions.153 
II. REMEDIES TO COMBAT THE REDUCTION IN ACCESS  
TO REPRODUCTIVE CARE 
As concerns about the effect of Catholic hospital mergers grew, advocates 
developed creative structural remedies to maintain access to reproductive health 
services.154 Although some of these solutions have been effective, they can be 
challenging to implement.155 Section A of this Part discusses the structural reme-
dies that have succeeded and those that did not.156 Section B addresses the new 
Directive 75 in the 2018 Directives update, which bans the establishment of a 
separate entity to provide prohibited services, one of the innovative remedies 
used to provide access to reproductive care in Catholic hospitals, and describes 
the effect it could have on future Catholic hospital mergers.157 
A. Creative Structural Remedies 
Over the past decade, reproductive health care advocates have developed 
structural remedies to ensure access to reproductive health services following a 
                                                                                                                           
47 B.C. L. REV. 815, 831 (2006) (“[F]or a woman located in a rural area, the only practically available 
hospital may be Catholic; as such, her ability to access many reproductive services may be severely 
limited.”). 
 151 KAYE ET AL., supra note 24, at 24. 
 152 See supra Part I. 
 153 See infra Part II. 
 154 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 11–13 (describing recent Catholic hospital mergers and 
the methods used when adopting the Directives); Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58 
(evaluating two Catholic hospital mergers in New York State and the remedies implemented to con-
tinue access to reproductive care services in the local communities); Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 
4 (discussing hospital within hospital arrangements to satisfy the Directives after a Catholic hospital 
merger). 
 155 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 42 (emphasizing that these remedies can 
only be accomplished through cooperation with hospital officials, local community advocates, and 
state officials); Cohn, supra note 6 (explaining that although the creative structural remedies may 
seem to be false distinctions, they achieve their purpose in preserving reproductive health care after a 
Catholic hospital merger). 
 156 See infra Part II.A. 
 157 See infra Part II.B. 
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merger with a Catholic hospital.158 When a Catholic hospital system announces 
its plan to acquire a non-Catholic hospital, concerned community members, 
including physicians at the non-Catholic hospital, women’s health organiza-
tions, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer or questioning (LGBTQ) 
organizations, and local officials work together to create a solution that pre-
serves local reproductive health care services.159 These remedies can be char-
acterized in two ways: (1) as a hospital within a hospital or (2) a hospital be-
side a hospital.160 
In the hospital within a hospital model, a formerly non-Catholic hospital 
that becomes Catholic-owned carves out a floor or wing in the physical build-
ing as a separate entity.161 This distinct facility then provides services prohibit-
ed under the Directives.162 The Burdett Birth Center, originally the Burdett 
Care Center, in Troy, New York is one of the most well-known examples of 
this model.163 In 2011, St. Peter’s Health Care Services and Seton Health, both 
Catholic health care systems, merged with Northeast Health, a non-Catholic 
system, to become St. Peter’s Health Partners.164 There were only two hospi-
                                                                                                                           
 158 See UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 11–13 (listing case studies of Catholic hospital 
mergers and the subsequent adoption of the Directives); Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra 
note 58, at 38 (discussing examples of creative solutions to Catholic hospital mergers in New York 
State); Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4 (examining hospital within hospital arrangements to satisfy 
the Directives in the wake of a Catholic hospital merger). 
 159 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 42 (noting that it takes an extraordinary 
amount of work and commitment on the part of these various constituencies to advocate and create 
these separate entities that continue to offer services prohibited under the Directives). 
 160 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 12; Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, 
at 38; Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4. These two different models refer to separate corporate enti-
ties that are physically located either directly inside or nearby the new Catholic hospital. Uttley et al., 
New York State Model, supra note 58, at 38. 
 161 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 41; Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4. 
This structure establishes a separate, smaller hospital where patients can still receive prohibited ser-
vices, although the larger, but corporately separate hospital surrounding it, must follow the Directives. 
Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4. 
 162 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 38, 41–42; Penan & Chen, supra note 10, 
at 4. 
 163 Uttley et al.,  New York State Model, supra note 58, at 41–42; Cohn, supra note 6; Martin, Catho-
lic Bishops Vote to Revise Rules, supra note 57; Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4; Press Release, supra 
note 70. After years of proposals, the merging parties created this independently licensed, non-Catholic 
facility. Martin, Catholic Bishops Vote to Revise Rules, supra note 57. Lois Uttley, a women’s and 
LGBTQ health activist who founded the MergerWatch Project and was involved in the negotiations, later 
told ProPublica that the “compromise” has “worked very well.” Id. The Burdett Care Center changed its 
name to the Burdett Birth Center in 2017. Claire Hughes, Troy Maternity Hospital’s Name Changes to 
Burdett Birth Center, NEWSTIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.newstimes.com/business/article/Troy-
maternity-hospital-s-name-changes-to-Burdett-10833587.php [https://perma.cc/9LUC-7JYD]. 
 164 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 41; Press Release, supra note 70. The 
merger brought together 125 health care facilities in seven counties in northeastern New York State. 
Press Release, supra note 70. The Catholic organizations, St. Peter’s Health Care Services and Seton 
Health, kept their Catholic identity, whereas Northeast Health continued to be a non-Catholic organi-
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tals in the city of Troy, Samaritan Hospital, part of Northeast Health, and St. 
Mary’s, part of Seton Health.165 Because Northeast Health had to follow the 
Directives pursuant to the merger agreement, but for the Burdett Birth Center, 
Troy’s residents would have been left without a hospital providing certain crit-
ical reproductive health care services.166 Thus, Northeast Health administra-
tors, local community officials, and reproductive health advocates worked to-
gether to create the Burdett Birth Center, an independently licensed hospital, 
contained on a separate floor of the Samaritan Hospital.167 The Burdett Birth 
Center offers both maternity and sterilization services, including tubal ligations 
and vasectomies.168 The Northeast Health administrators were successful in 
continuing to provide some prohibited services to Troy residents, but the mer-
ger agreement prevented Burdett Birth Center from offering elective abortions, 
so patients still must travel to other providers for these services.169 
The hospital within a hospital model was also employed in Austin, Texas, 
when University Medical Center-Brackenridge (UMCB) affiliated, rather than 
formally merged, with Seton Healthcare Family, a Catholic health care sys-
tem.170 This affiliation was originally structured as a lease agreement in 1995, 
                                                                                                                           
zation. Id. Post-merger, however, the entirety of St. Peter’s Health Partners was required to abide by 
the Directives. Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 41. 
 165 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 41. In the 1990s, there were three hospi-
tals in the city. Id. Along with non-Catholic Samaritan Hospital and Catholic St. Mary’s, Leonard 
Hospital was non-Catholic. Id. In 1994, St. Mary’s and Leonard merged into Seton Health, and Leon-
ard Hospital stopped providing contraceptive services. Id. 
 166 Id. Non-profit women’s reproductive rights organizations got involved in the negotiations 
when it became apparent that the city of Troy could be left without access to reproductive health care 
services post-merger if both Samaritan and Seton Health became part of the merged entity. Id. 
 167 Id.; Martin, Catholic Bishops Vote to Revise Rules, supra note 57; Press Release, supra note 
70. The Burdett Birth Center is on the second floor of Samaritan Hospital and contains fifteen beds. 
Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 41. All maternity services in the hospital were 
relocated to the Burdett Birth Center. Id. The Burdett Birth Center’s accounting, employees, and board 
of directors are separate from St. Peter’s Health Partners. Cohn, supra note 6; Penan & Chen, supra 
note 10, at 4. 
 168 Press Release, supra note 70. 
 169 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 41. During merger negotiations, the 
Catholic health care systems demanded that Northeast Health and the Burdett Birth Center prohibit 
elective abortions. Id. Patients seeking elective abortions must either go to other local providers who 
agreed to accept them, or if hospital services are necessary, they are referred to Albany Medical Cen-
ter. Id. The merger eliminated all hospital abortions in Rensselaer County. Cathleen F. Crowley, Birth 
Services to Be Merged, TIMES UNION (Nov. 20, 2009), https://www.timesunion.com/local/article/
Birth-services-to-be-merged-557636.php [https://perma.cc/7C2R-V6E5]. 
 170 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 12. A merger typically combines corporate assets and 
governance, whereas in an affiliation, there may still be a separate ownership structure, without one 
hospital acquiring the assets of another entity. See Valerie Bauman, Hospital Affiliation vs. Merger: 
There Is a Difference, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Aug. 23, 2013), https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/
health-care-inc/2013/08/hospital-affiliation-vs-merger-there.html [https://perma.cc/KA3X-8794?type=
image] (explaining that although the difference between the two terms can merely be “semantics” to 
hide an association with the Catholic Church, “affiliations can also be a separate partnership structure 
with varying degrees of commingling”); see also supra note 8. University Medical Center-
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such that Seton merely leased the hospital property, but it did not gain corpo-
rate control of UMCB, a public hospital owned by the city of Austin, so 
UMCB did not become a Catholic hospital.171 Through this technicality, 
UMCB did not have to follow the Directives, and thus access to reproductive 
health services could continue.172 Although the local Catholic diocese initially 
approved the lease agreement, the Vatican ultimately challenged it, leading the 
UMCB to turn to the hospital within a hospital model, even though the part-
nership was an affiliation and not a merger.173 In 2001, the Austin Women’s 
Hospital opened on the fifth floor of the hospital as a separate corporate entity 
run by the University of Texas Medical Branch.174 The Austin Women’s Hospi-
tal provided services prohibited by the Directives until 2012, when funding for 
the hospital ran out.175 The Austin Women’s Hospital’s patients were trans-
ferred to a nearby hospital that provided reproductive health services.176 
                                                                                                                           
Brackenridge (UMCB) is a public safety net hospital owned by the city of Austin. UTTLEY & KHAI-
KIN, supra note 22, at 12. The Institute of Medicine defines a safety net hospital as one that “offer[s] 
care to patients regardless of their ability to pay for those services,” “either by legal mandate or ex-
plicitly adopted mission.” INST. OF MED., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY 
NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED 1 (2000), http://www.idph.state.il.us/tfhpr/materials/Carvalho%20
handout.pdf [https://perma.cc/G43H-6C2X]. UMCB is also the highest-level trauma hospital in the Aus-
tin region. Mary Ann Roser & Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Public Health, Religion Collide, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Dec. 9, 2012, at A01. When the affiliation between the two health care systems began in 
1995, Seton Healthcare Family was known as the Daughters of Charity, and today it is part of Ascension 
Health, one of the largest health care systems in the country. UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 12; 
Reed Abelson, Catholic Hospitals Expand, Religious Strings Attached, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/health/policy/growth-of-catholic-hospitals-may-limit-access-
to-reproductive-care.html [https://perma.cc/A9EJ-XEYH]; Roser & Haurwitz, supra. Under the 
terms of the affiliation, the city of Austin continued to own the hospital, but Seton managed the facili-
ty. UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 12. 
 171 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 12. This arrangement of using a lease agreement rather 
than a merger allowed UMCB to continue to provide access to reproductive health services. Id. 
 172 Id. A privately-contracted company, paid by the city of Austin, managed the reproductive 
health services, rather than Seton physicians, to maintain separation between the Catholic and non-
Catholic services. Id.; Roser & Haurwitz, supra note 170. Under the lease agreement, UMCB contin-
ued to offer sterilization services, but not elective abortions. Roser & Haurwitz, supra note 170. 
 173 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 12; Roser & Haurwitz, supra note 170. The Vatican 
informed Bishop John McCarthy of Austin that the lease agreement between Seton and UMCB was 
unacceptable, and the Austin City Council authorized a hospital within a hospital. Roser & Haurwitz, 
supra note 170. 
 174 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 12. The Austin Women’s Hospital was built with a 
separate entrance and elevator to the fifth floor of the hospital, so it was truly separate from the rest of 
the hospital that was still run by Seton and followed the Catholic Directives. Id. The entrance and 
elevator cost $9 million to build. Id. 
 175 Id. The University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) lost the financial backing to run the 
hospital. Id. UTMB suffered a $114 million budget cut by the Texas legislature, which contributed to 
the decision to close the Austin Women’s Hospital. Mary Ann Roser, UTMB to Leave Women’s Hos-
pital, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 1, 2011, at B05. 
 176 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 12. The patients were transferred to St. David’s Hospi-
tal, an Episcopalian hospital located a mile away from UMCB. Id.; Roser & Haurwitz, supra note 170. 
Although the change in location was difficult for patients, medical residents also had to travel between 
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Creating a hospital beside a hospital is another frequent mechanism for 
continuing to deliver reproductive health services after a Catholic hospital 
merges with a non-Catholic institution.177 In Kingston, New York, Benedictine 
Hospital, a Catholic institution, and Kingston Hospital, a non-Catholic facility, 
merged in 2004.178 Because community organizers were vocal regarding the 
need to preserve reproductive health services in Kingston, the hospitals decid-
ed to create a separate corporate facility for reproductive services.179 The hos-
pitals, Archdiocese of New York, and state officials worked together to con-
                                                                                                                           
UMCB and St. David’s to receive training in obstetrics and gynecology, creating a considerable in-
crease in time spent traveling than when the Austin Women’s Hospital was in the same building as 
UMCB. See Roser & Haurwitz, supra note 170 (interviewing a medical resident about the difficulties 
presented by moving the patients to St. David’s). Additionally, shifting the patients to another hospital 
is possible in an urban city like Austin, but this solution may not be viable in a rural area where a 
Catholic facility is the only hospital in the region. See UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5–6, 12 
(explaining that there are at least forty-six Catholic “sole community hospitals,” meaning that they are 
at least thirty-five miles from another hospital, in the United States). 
 177 See Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 38 (explaining both a hospital with-
in a hospital and hospital beside a hospital model); Cohn, supra note 6 (describing situations where 
hospitals and surgery centers were set up in the parking lot or next door to the original health care 
facility). 
 178 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 39. Kingston and Benedictine Hospital 
were within a mile of each other. Id. The two hospitals first proposed a merger in 1997 with non-
Catholic Northern Dutchess Hospital, but the transaction failed a year later due to concerns about 
compliance with the Directives and the merger’s impact on reproductive health care services, as well 
as an FTC investigation into antitrust violations. Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 33–36; 
Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 39. Several outspoken community groups in the 
Hudson River Valley contacted public officials, signed petitions, posted lawn signs, wrote editorials, 
and organized rallies in their opposition to the merger. Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 34. 
Although they were not required to file with federal antitrust agencies under the HSR Act, the FTC 
began investigating the merger a year later, with the assistance of MergerWatch and the National 
Women’s Law Center. Id. at 34–35. Subsequently, Northern Dutchess Hospital dropped out of the 
agreement, but Kingston and Benedictine Hospitals continued to seek a merger. Id. at 35. Around the 
same time, the FTC won a hospital merger case in Missouri, and perhaps reading the tea leaves, King-
ston and Benedictine dissolved their merger agreement. See FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 
F. Supp. 2d 937, 949 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (granting the FTC’s motion for a preliminary injunction enjoin-
ing the merger between Tenet Healthcare Corporation and Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, later over-
turned by the 8th Circuit), rev’d, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 
34, at 35–36 (suggesting that the FTC’s success in the Missouri hospital case contributed to the failure 
of the Kingston and Benedictine merger). 
 179 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 39–40. Because the 1997 merger dis-
solved partly due to concerns over access to reproductive health services, community advocates and 
the two hospitals worked with New York’s Berger Commission to develop a feasible plan for the 
transaction. Id. In 2005, the Commission issued a report on health care systems in New York State 
and addressed the proposed merger. COMM’N ON HEALTH CARE FACILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 
N.Y. HEALTH CARE COMM’N, A PLAN TO STABILIZE AND STRENGTHEN NEW YORK’S HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON HEALTH CARE FACILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
12 (2006), https://nyhealthcarecommission.health.ny.gov/docs/final/commissionfinalreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S8BC-EK2S]; Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 39–40. The 
Commission recommended that Kingston and Benedictine should merge, but only if the Catholic 
Church allowed Kingston to “continue[] to provide access to reproductive services in a location prox-
imate to the hospital.” COMM’N ON HEALTH CARE FACILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra. 
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struct the Foxhall Ambulatory Surgery Center in Kingston Hospital’s parking 
lot.180 The outpatient ambulatory surgery center offers all maternity services 
that used to be provided separately at Kingston Hospital and Benedictine Hos-
pital, as well as services prohibited by the Directives including abortions and 
tubal ligations.181 The center offers some non-reproductive health care services 
as well.182 
In 2012 in Seattle, Swedish Medical Center affiliated with Providence 
Health & Services, a Catholic health care system.183 By merely affiliating with 
a Catholic facility, rather than merging, Swedish Medical Center remained a 
secular facility and did not have to abide by the Directives as they existed in 
2012.184 Thus, Swedish Medical Center continued to offer sterilization ser-
vices, but it ceased performing elective abortions.185 As a compromise, Swe-
dish Medical Center gave two million dollars to Planned Parenthood so the 
organization could build and operate a facility in a building next door to the 
                                                                                                                           
 180 Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 40. The Archdiocese signed off on the 
compromise, but he would not allow Kingston to create a separate hospital within the hospital. Id. The 
New York State government provided $4 million to construct the Foxhall Ambulatory Surgery Center. 
Id. 
 181 Id. The Foxhall Ambulatory Surgery Center is 5,500 square feet and immediately next door to 
Kingston Hospital, but it is a separate corporate entity. Id. Several staff at both Kingston Hospital and 
the Foxhall Ambulatory Surgery Center were moved to a separate, unaffiliated company’s payroll, 
and they are leased back to both the Catholic hospitals and the ambulatory surgery center. Id. This 
arrangement allows Benedictine Hospital to avoid violating the Directives by not directly paying its 
staff for services provided at the ambulatory surgery center. Id. 
 182 Id. Kingston Hospital decided to provide some non-reproductive services at the Foxhall Am-
bulatory Surgery Center to encourage more revenue for the facility and to offer some privacy for its 
patients, so it would not be obvious that they were visiting the center for reproductive health care. Id. 
 183 Carol M. Ostrom, Swedish Alliance with Providence Is Now Complete, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 1, 
2012), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/swedish-alliance-with-providence-is-now-complete/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200404110033/https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/swedish-
alliance-with-providence-is-now-complete/]. Because the Swedish Medical Center (Swedish) and 
Providence Health & Services (Providence) combined through an affiliation rather than a merger, 
Swedish was able to stay secular and continue to provide birth control, tubal ligations, and vasecto-
mies. Nina Martin, As Catholic Hospitals Grow Will Women and Gays Be Left Without Care?, PAC. 
STANDARD (Jun. 14, 2017), https://psmag.com/social-justice/catholic-hospitals-grow-questions-care-
69840 [https://perma.cc/9PC8-UURG] [hereinafter Martin, As Catholic Hospitals Grow]; Ostrom, 
supra. Under the terms of the affiliation, Swedish became a division of Providence Health Services. 
Ostrom, supra. But see Bauman, supra note 170 (highlighting that although the Providence-Swedish 
affiliation was promoted and advertised as an affiliation, instead of a merger, to maintain Swedish’s 
independence from the Catholic Church, in hindsight it appears similar to a merger, as the transaction 
did in fact create a new entity with a new board of directors). 
 184 Martin, As Catholic Hospitals Grow, supra note 183; Ostrom, supra note 183. Swedish told 
ProPublica that “[t]o ensure Providence remained Catholic and Swedish remained secular, the partner-
ship was intentionally structured as an affiliation.” Martin, As Catholic Hospitals Grow, supra note 
183. 
 185 Martin, As Catholic Hospitals Grow, supra note 183; Ostrom, supra note 183. Although Swe-
dish previously provided elective abortions, it stopped “out of respect for the affiliation.” Ostrom, 
supra note 183. 
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hospital.186 Although Swedish Medical Center continues to provide emergency 
abortions when medically necessary, patients seeking elective abortions must 
go to the Planned Parenthood clinic next door.187 The Providence-Swedish af-
filiation is an exceptionally “progressive” Catholic affiliation, as Swedish 
Medical Center does not follow the Directives and the hospital beside a hospi-
tal model allows it to work in conjunction with Planned Parenthood.188 
These creative structural remedies have worked with varying degrees of 
success to allow for the continuance of reproductive health services after a 
Catholic hospital merger.189 Although there are some shortcomings to the hos-
pital within a hospital and hospital beside a hospital models, on the whole they 
have been effective techniques to preserving access to care.190 
B. Updated Directives Threaten the Separate Entity Solution 
In 2018, the USCCB updated the Directives, specifically revising Part 
Six, “Collaborative Arrangements with Other Health Care Organizations and 
Providers.”191 Reproductive health care advocates became concerned that the 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Cienna Madrid, Faith Healers, THE STRANGER (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.thestranger.com/
seattle/faith-healers/Content?oid=16050396 [https://perma.cc/5PMQ-JQPG]; Martin, As Catholic 
Hospitals Grow, supra note 183; Ostrom, supra note 183; Kristen Glundberg-Prossor, PPGNW and 
Swedish Work Together to Ensure Abortion Care for Clients in Response to Swedish’s New Alliance 
with Providence, FOCUS ON PLANNED PARENTHOOD, Fall 2001, at 1, 4, https://www.plannedparenthood.
org/files/7114/0519/5068/Focus_Fall_2011_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/629H-4A6F]. The Planned 
Parenthood facility was built next door to Swedish, in the Nordstrom Tower. Glundberg-Prossor, 
supra. Patients can enter the clinic from the hospital through a breezeway. Madrid, supra. 
 187 Madrid, supra note 186; Mencimer, supra note 1. Even though Swedish has conducted emer-
gency abortions, the assumption that a Planned Parenthood facility can ameliorate the loss in access to 
reproductive health care after a Catholic hospital merger can be misguided. Mencimer, supra note 1. 
Certain abortions must take place in a hospital, not a clinic, to ensure medical safety. Id. 
 188 Madrid, supra note 186; Glundberg-Prossor, supra note 186, at 1. Some Catholic hospital 
transactions merely donate money to Planned Parenthood, with the assumption that the organization 
can fill the gap in reproductive health care services. Glundberg-Prossor, supra note 186, at 4. Swedish 
Medical Center, however, worked closely with Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest and its 
CEO, Chris Charbonneau, to connect the clinic to the hospital. Madrid, supra note 186. 
 189 See Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 42 (noting that although the New 
York State remedies were successful when originally implemented, their long-term efficacy is uncer-
tain). For example, the downside of creating a separate corporate entity for reproductive health ser-
vices is that it separates these services from other primary care services. Id. Additionally, because 
these reproductive health care facilities only offer certain limited services, they may not be as profita-
ble and likely to survive financially. Id. 
 190 Cohn, supra note 6 (“Convoluted solutions may be the only way for this convoluted mix of 
public purpose and private institution to survive.”). Dr. Peter Hasselbacher of the University of Louis-
ville, when commenting on a proposed hospital within a hospital in Louisville, described these solu-
tions as “‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ medicine” and noted that they are merely “one ‘work around’ after 
another” to preserve access to reproductive health services when public hospitals are acquired by 
Catholic hospital systems. Roser & Haurwitz, supra note 170. 
 191 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 23–26; DiVarco & Slattery, 
supra note 38; US Bishops Vote to Expand Directives for Catholic Healthcare, CONSCIENCE (Aug. 
31, 2018), https://consciencemag.org/2018/08/31/us-bishops-vote-to-expand-directives-for-catholic-
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new Directives would be used to ban the formation of creative structural reme-
dies that protect reproductive services.192 In fact, prior to the update, the presi-
dent of the National Catholic Bioethics Center described these creative struc-
tural remedies as a “ruse,” arguing that they should not have been permitted by 
local bishops.193 
Unfortunately, the reproductive health care advocates’ fears were well-
founded, as the addition of Directive 75 may be interpreted to restrict the use 
of the hospital within a hospital and hospital beside a hospital tactics to protect 
reproductive care.194 Directive 75 explicitly prohibits “establish[ing] another 
entity that would oversee, manage, or perform immoral procedures.”195 It then 
defines this as executing “civil bylaws, policies, or procedures of the entity, es-
tablishing the finances of the entity, or legally incorporating the entity.”196 The 
Burdett Birth Center in Troy, the Austin Women’s Hospital, and the Foxhall 
Ambulatory Surgery Center in Kingston were all separately incorporated enti-
ties, built to provide the reproductive health services designated as “immoral 
procedures” in the Directives.197 The Swedish Medical Center in Seattle gave 
Planned Parenthood the financial backing to build a clinic next door to the hospi-
tal.198 Not only could Directive 75 stop future arrangements, but it could also 
jeopardize existing arrangements, such as the Burdett Birth Center, Foxhall Am-
                                                                                                                           
healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/3X9E-KG99]; Changes to Catholic Ethical and Religious Directives 
Impact Mergers and Partnerships Between Catholic and Non-Catholic Entities, HALL RENDER BLOG: 
HEALTH L. NEWS (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.hallrender.com/2018/08/02/changes-to-catholic-
ethical-and-religious-directives-impact-mergers-and-partnerships-between-catholic-and-non-catholic-
entities/ [https://perma.cc/M537-4VEW]. 
 192 See Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that the future of these innovative structural 
remedies is uncertain, and the revised Directives “could threaten the survival of these institutions”). 
Directive 75 prohibits “establish[ing] another entity” to “perform immoral procedures.” 2018 ETHI-
CAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. 
 193 Meyer, supra note 68. The president of the National Catholic Bioethics Center, John Haas, 
suggested that bishops may request that the Center review existing structural remedies, or “carve-out 
arrangements,” for compliance with the Directives. Id. 
 194 See Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4 (“It is unclear whether these types of arrangements 
would be possible under the revised [Directives] . . . .”). 
 195 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. Catholics believe Directive 
75 displays the sentiment of Vatican Principle 12, which decrees that “setting up an administrative 
body” or “an entity such as a clinic” that offers “immoral procedures” is considered “formal coopera-
tion with evil.” U.S. Bishops Revise Part Six of the Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 50, at 
16. 
 196 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. Observers note that the spe-
cific language of Directive 75 removes any “discretion” that local bishops previously had to approve 
mergers between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals where one hospital remained non-Catholic on 
the condition that it was legally separate. DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38. 
 197 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26; UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra 
note 22, at 12; Uttley et al., New York State Model, supra note 58, at 41–42. 
 198 Madrid, supra note 186; Martin, As Catholic Hospitals Grow, supra note 183. Swedish Medi-
cal Center gave Planned Parenthood of the Greater Northwest $2 million to establish a clinic in the 
medical tower next to the hospital. Martin, As Catholic Hospitals Grow, supra note 183. 
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bulatory Surgery Center, and Swedish Medical Center.199 Depending on the local 
bishop’s understanding of the new Directives in the 2018 update, the Catholic 
Church could “rescind the arrangement.”200 Directive 75 thus expressly targets 
and outlaws these inventive solutions hospitals have used in the past to sustain 
reproductive health services.201 Without further guidance from the Catholic 
Church, health care advocates and lawyers cannot predict whether these solu-
tions will be allowed in future mergers.202 The new Directives, however, certain-
ly cast doubt on their viability.203 
Additionally, Swedish Medical Center affiliated with Providence Health 
& Services, rather than merging to become one corporate entity, to avoid com-
pliance with the Directives post-transaction.204 The hospital systems intention-
ally chose this technique so that Swedish Medical Center could remain secular 
and continue to provide birth control, tubal ligations, and vasectomies, all of 
which are banned by the Directives.205 The new Directive 73, however, makes 
these transactions unacceptable.206 Directive 73 instructs that when a Catholic 
facility considers “affiliating” with a non-Catholic institution, it must confirm 
that its officials and employees will not be involved in “immoral procedures” 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See Meyer, supra note 68 (suggesting that the Burdett Birth Center could be reviewed for 
compliance with the new Directives). 
 200 Id. Philip Boyle, the senior vice president of mission and ethics for Trinity Health, which owns 
St. Peter’s Health Partners and Samaritan Hospital where the Burdett Birth Center is located, agreed 
that the Burdett Birth Center might appear to be “smoke and mirrors.” Id. Furthermore, he emphasized 
that at the time, the local bishop permitted this hospital within a hospital model. Id. Despite this assur-
ance, Mr. Boyle told Modern Healthcare there is a chance that the Catholic Church could “rescind the 
arrangement” if the local bishop chose to review the carve-out solution for compliance with the new 
Directives. Id. 
 201 See Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4 (illustrating how facilities like the Burdett Birth Center 
may no longer be allowed under the new Directives); Changes to Catholic Ethical and Religious Di-
rectives, supra note 191 (noting that the updated Directives implicate these arrangements that are 
intended to maintain reproductive health services). 
 202 DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38 (explaining that health care lawyers still cannot predict 
how the Catholic Church will assess these organizations in future Catholic hospital mergers). 
 203 See Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4 (stating that it is still uncertain how the Catholic 
Church will implement these Directives in future transactions); Meyer, supra note 68 (quoting Bishop 
Robert McManus of Massachusetts, explaining that existing partnership arrangements may have to be 
reviewed in light of the revised Directives). Not only is the possibility of using structural remedies in 
the future at risk, but also the current arrangements may be rescinded by local bishops if they are 
found to be in violation of the revised Directives. Meyer, supra note 68. 
 204 Martin, As Catholic Hospitals Grow, supra note 183. Swedish Medical Center purposefully 
affiliated with Providence Health & Services, rather than merging, to be able to continue offering 
services banned by the Directives. Id. 
 205 Id. Swedish Medical Center gave a statement to ProPublica, explaining that “[t]o ensure Prov-
idence remained Catholic and Swedish remained secular, the partnership was intentionally structured 
as an affiliation, not a merger or acquisition.” Id. 
 206 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26; DiVarco & Slattery, supra 
note 38; Changes to Catholic Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 191. 
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in any form.207 Thus, even in affiliations, hospital administrations must be kept 
completely distinct, but in the Swedish-Providence affiliation, Swedish Medi-
cal Center became a division of Providence Health & Services.208 In the future, 
progressive affiliations like Swedish-Providence, where Swedish Medical Cen-
ter continued to provide services prohibited by the Directives even though it 
was a division of Providence Health & Services, may not be possible because 
they contradict the principles in Directive 73.209 The following Part evaluates 
the potential role that federal antitrust law could hold in maintaining access to 
reproductive health care, while addressing the possible obstacles and alterna-
tive approaches to regulating these mergers.210 
III. EVALUATING ANTITRUST’S POTENTIAL ROLE IN PRESERVING  
ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE POST-CATHOLIC  
HOSPITAL MERGER 
The 2018 update to the Directives demands a new approach to maintain 
access to reproductive health care in the wake of a Catholic hospital merger.211 
Antitrust law presents a unique opportunity to scrutinize certain mergers for 
anticompetitive harm and ensure that reproductive health services are pre-
served for the community post-merger.212 Although women’s health advocates, 
concerned about the reproductive health consequences of Catholic hospital 
mergers, have encouraged applying antitrust laws to the mergers for more than 
two decades, antitrust review may be an even more vital tool after the 2018 
update to the Directives abolished the ability to create a separate entity to pro-
                                                                                                                           
 207 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26. Directive 73 focuses on hos-
pital administration and employees, explicitly stating that individuals at all levels must avoid engaging 
in “immoral procedures.” U.S. Bishops Revise Part Six of the Ethical and Religious Directives, supra 
note 50, at 15. 
 208 DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 38 (noting that Directive 73 seems to require completely sepa-
rate administrations in any type of affiliation where the non-Catholic hospital continues to offer pro-
hibited services); Ostrom, supra note 183. 
 209 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26; see DiVarco & Slattery, 
supra note 38 (noting that the separation demanded by Directive 73 may force current affiliations to 
reorganize); Madrid, supra note 186 (describing the Swedish-Providence affiliation as “one of the 
most progressive Catholic hospital partnerships in the state” of Washington). 
 210 See infra Part III. 
 211 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9; see DiVarco & Slattery, supra note 
38 (addressing the new Directives and their unknown impact on future collaborations between Catho-
lic and non-Catholic hospitals); Changes to Catholic Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 191 
(noting that the new Directives “raise questions about the future of carve-out arrangements designed 
to preserve access to health care services forbidden by Catholic doctrine”). 
 212 JUDITH C. APPELBAUM, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., HOSPITAL MERGERS AND THE THREAT TO 
WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES: USING ANTITRUST LAWS TO FIGHT BACK 1 (1998); 
Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 1. 
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vide these vital services.213 Section A of this Part explains how a Catholic hos-
pital merger could raise antitrust concerns.214 Section B addresses possible 
problems and critiques of this approach, especially with respect to smaller, ru-
ral hospital mergers.215 Section C suggests that state attorneys general can play 
a role in counteracting the effects of Catholic hospital mergers on reproductive 
health care access.216 
A. Catholic Hospital Mergers May Result in Anticompetitive Unilateral 
Effects Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
The antitrust laws are intended to preserve competition and avoid con-
sumer harm by preventing mergers that create market power.217 The FTC and 
DOJ’s Guidelines define a merger that increases market power as one that 
“raise[s] price, reduce[s] output, diminish[es] innovation, or otherwise harm[s] 
consumers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives.”218 
A merger between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals that results in the uni-
lateral effect of eliminating competition for reproductive health services may 
be considered anticompetitive under the antitrust laws.219 
The FTC staff often begins their merger review by defining the market, 
which is a crucial method for understanding the competitive effects of a Catho-
lic hospital merger.220 Although the FTC frequently uses inpatient GAC ser-
                                                                                                                           
 213 See 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26 (updating the Directives 
with respect to collaborative arrangements); APPELBAUM, supra note 212 (describing the antitrust 
laws as a “powerful weapon” to challenge Catholic hospital mergers in 1998); Appelbaum & Morri-
son, supra note 34, at 1 (advocating for the use of antitrust laws to confront Catholic hospital mergers 
in 2000); Penan & Chen, supra note 10, at 4 (remarking that it is uncertain if the hospital within a 
hospital model will be permitted by the Catholic Church in future transactions); DiVarco & Slattery, 
supra note 38 (explaining that the updates concerning collaborative arrangements make the legality of 
separate legal entities questionable). 
 214 See infra Part III.A. 
 215 See infra Part III.B. 
 216 See infra Part III.C. 
 217 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 1–2. Preventing mergers that expand 
market power is “[t]he unifying theme of the[] Guidelines.” Id. at 2. 
 218 Id. at 2. Evaluating potential consumer harm is crucial in the merger review process, as the 
current antitrust policy advocates for promoting consumer welfare and limiting market power. Wilson, 
supra note 99. 
 219 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 20; APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 16; 
Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 17. Post-merger, when the non-Catholic hospital is required 
to abide by the Directives and stop providing reproductive health services, there is a reduction in 
competition for them. APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 16; Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 
17. 
 220 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 7 (remarking that the antitrust 
agencies often begin their investigation with market definition, but it is not required); APPELBAUM, 
supra note 212, at 16–17 (explaining how reproductive health services could be a relevant product 
market under the Guidelines); Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 17–18 (delineating how 
reproductive health services can fit into a Guidelines product market analysis). 
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vices as the product market when investigating a hospital merger, individual 
hospital services can also be their own product markets, depending on the rele-
vant evidence and economic data.221 The products in a chosen product market 
should be substitutes for each other, and the FTC primarily chooses GAC ser-
vices for ease of analysis and administrability.222 If the evidence and data indi-
cated a possible reduction in access to reproductive services, however, FTC 
staff could instead define the product market as reproductive health care ser-
vices, as they have done in previous hospital merger cases.223 In fact, when 
evaluating a merger between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals, it is crucial 
to define the reproductive health care services product market separately from 
the GAC services market, as there will be unique competitive effects when not 
all of the merging parties offer reproductive health services.224 
Once the FTC defines the product market, staff must identify the geo-
graphic market that would suffer as a result of the merger.225 Although the ge-
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 18 (highlighting that although GAC services 
are usually the designated product market in hospital mergers, the FTC has defined the market along 
more specific services lines in some cases); Gilman et al., supra note 92 (“The product market in 
hospital cases is typically inpatient general acute care (GAC) hospital services sold to commercial 
health plans.”). A product market contains products or services that are substitutes for each other, 
which allows the antitrust agencies to measure the competition in the relevant market for these prod-
ucts. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 7–8. 
 222 Id. at 7; Gilman et al., supra note 92. Hospitals often offer hundreds of services to patients, so 
it would be incredibly difficult and time-consuming for FTC staff to analyze every service line as an 
independent product market. Gilman et al., supra note 92. The GAC services market is a cluster mar-
ket. Id. A cluster market contains various products that are not substitutes, but “the competitive condi-
tions—such as the number of competitors and entry conditions—are similar for the products or ser-
vices included in the cluster market.” Gilman et al., supra note 92; see FTC v. Advocate Health Care 
Network, 841 F.3d 460, 467–68 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing cluster product markets). 
 223 APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 16; Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 18. The FTC 
has litigated narrower, more specific product markets in hospital merger cases in the past. See FTC v. 
ProMedica Health Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33434, at *147–48 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (analyzing both 
a GAC and inpatient obstetrical services product market); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 
F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (utilizing both a GAC and primary care inpatient services 
product market). 
 224 See ProMedica Health Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33434, at *147–48 (defining inpatient 
obstetrical services as a distinct product market because two of the hospitals did not provide them, and 
thus, the competitive conditions were different than those for GAC services). The FTC does not in-
clude services that only one of the merging parties provides in a GAC services product market, be-
cause the competitive effects are different. Gilman et al., supra note 92. This situation occurred in 
ProMedica Health Systems, where two of the merging parties did not offer obstetrical services, so the 
FTC alleged a separate product market for them. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33434, at *147–48. The court 
held that it would be “inappropriate – and misleading – to include obstetrical services in the GAC 
cluster market,” and they must be “separately analyzed.” Id. 
 225 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 13; Gilman et al., supra note 92. The 
geographic market is the area in which customers are willing and able to substitute the product at 
issue, in this case, reproductive health services, with a competitor’s product. HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 13; APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 17–18; Appelbaum & Morrison, 
supra note 34, at 19–21; Gilman et al., supra note 92. 
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ographic market definition for hospital mergers is fact-specific, patients often 
prefer to visit local hospitals, and it is quite possible that patients seeking re-
productive health services would not be willing to travel far from home.226 For 
example, services like an abortion or a tubal ligation after a caesarian section 
are time-sensitive procedures, so patients may not be able to travel long dis-
tances for them.227 Transportation can also be expensive and may prevent low-
er income patients from being able to access necessary reproductive health 
services.228 If so, this would indicate that the merging hospitals compete in a 
narrow geographic market.229 If there are no other or very few competing hos-
pitals in the same geographic market that provide these reproductive health 
services, there is a strong argument that the proposed merger would enhance 
market power, which is illegal under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.230 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d at 474 (explaining that patients usually seek 
treatment at local hospitals); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 13 (“The scope of 
geographic markets often depends on transportation costs.”); APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 17–18 
(highlighting that patients often may not be willing or able to travel to other hospitals for reproductive 
health care services if those services were eliminated post-merger due to expense and timing); Appel-
baum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 21 (emphasizing that people typically do not like to travel far for 
hospital treatment); Gilman et al., supra note 92 (explaining that geographic market definition is high-
ly debated in litigation and depends on “qualitative and quantitative evidence from the merging” hos-
pitals, competitors, and consumers). 
 227 APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 18; Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 21. Medical 
services like an abortion or the morning after pill are time-sensitive, and it may not be practical or 
possible for patients to travel long distances for these procedures. APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 18; 
Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 21. Doctors often give patients tubal ligations immediately 
after delivery, but if that service is not offered at a certain hospital, patients would have to deliver at 
one facility and then receive tubal litigation surgery at another, which is a time-consuming and risky 
arrangement. See Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, supra note 1 (interviewing Dr. Bruce Silva at Sierra 
Vista Health Center about his patient who planned to get a tubal ligation after her caesarean section, 
but, because of the Directives, had to undergo the second surgery in a different city). 
 228 APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 18; Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 21. Some states 
require a waiting period between an abortion consultation and the actual procedure. APPELBAUM, 
supra note 212, at 18; Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 21. This could force the patient to 
travel twice to a different facility, and the patient may be unwilling or unable to do so due to the fi-
nancial and time expenses. APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 18; Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 
34, at 21. 
 229 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 13; APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 17–
18; Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 20–21; Gilman et al., supra note 92. If a patient is una-
ble or unwilling to travel outside a small geographic region to access reproductive health services, the 
geographic market is constrained to where the patient will travel. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 
supra note 95, at 13; APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 17–18; Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, 
at 20–21; Gilman et al., supra note 92. 
 230 See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018) (outlawing mergers or acquisitions that may “substantially lessen 
competition”); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 1–2 (emphasizing that mergers 
that “enhance market power” are not allowed); APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 17–18 (illustrating 
how a narrow geographic market with few other hospitals providing reproductive health services pre-
sents anticompetitive concerns); Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 21–22 (explaining that 
market power speaks to the merger’s anticompetitive effects). 
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When litigating a proposed merger under Section 7, the antitrust agencies 
usually argue that the combined firm’s high market concentration in the rele-
vant market leads to a presumption that the merger will “substantially lessen 
competition.”231 If the defendant merging parties rebut the presumption, the 
agency has the burden of demonstrating further anticompetitive effects of the 
proposed merger.232 In this scenario, however, where a Catholic hospital mer-
ger results in the elimination of the reproductive health services product mar-
ket, the agency would not be able to argue that the combined entity has an un-
lawfully high market concentration in the relevant market, as it would no long-
er operate in the relevant market post-merger.233 Although it is unusual for the 
agencies to block a merger without market concentration evidence, a Catholic 
hospital merger’s elimination of a service line should be a persuasive adverse 
competitive effect, such that the FTC could consider it in an antitrust analysis.234 
The elimination of reproductive health care services post-merger not only 
“lessen[s] competition” for these services—it eliminates competition because the 
services are no longer offered.235 The Guidelines emphasize that the ability to 
eliminate competition is indicative of a combined firm’s enhanced market pow-
er, and thus a Catholic hospital’s prohibition on certain reproductive health ser-
                                                                                                                           
 231 15 U.S.C. § 18; United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990); FTC 
v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 36 (D.D.C. 2009); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 
supra note 95, at 18. As discussed supra, the antitrust agencies use the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index 
(HHI) to measure pre- and post-merger market shares to evaluate if they are unlawful. HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 18–19; see supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 232 Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d at 983–84; CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 36. This 
analytical framework for a Section 7 case is referred to as the “Baker Hughes Burden-Shifting 
Framework.” FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 115 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 233 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 18 (illustrating how the antitrust 
agencies calculate the likely change in market concentration in the relevant market pre- and post-
merger). Presumably, if the merger eliminated all reproductive health service offerings, then the com-
bined health care system would not have a significant, or any, share of the reproductive health care 
market. See id. at 18–19 (explaining the use of HHI to determine market shares). 
 234 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962) (noting that although 
market shares “are . . . the primary index of market power[,] . . . only a further examination of the 
particular market—its structure, history, and probable future—can provide the appropriate setting for 
judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger”); CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 
37 (explaining that the court must examine the actual impact on competition in the market to under-
stand potential anticompetitive effects); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 18 
(stating that “[m]arket shares may not fully reflect the competitive significance of . . . the impact of a 
merger[, and] . . . [t]hey are used in conjunction with other evidence of competitive effects”). 
 235 See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (prohibiting mergers or acquisitions that may “substantially lessen compe-
tition”); Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 17 (arguing that limiting reproductive health care 
service offerings results in a decrease in competition). Although this is far from the classic antitrust 
merger analysis, it is conceivable that removing a product line from the market post-merger “substan-
tially lessen[s] competition” by eliminating competition altogether. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (outlawing 
mergers or acquisitions that may “substantially lessen competition”). 
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vices should be evidence of its enhanced market power post-merger.236 The anti-
trust agencies consider whether a combined firm will stop offering a service as 
evidence of unilateral effects.237 Because the elimination of reproductive health 
services would result in a reduction in overall competition in the market, the 
agencies could argue it is an anticompetitive unilateral effect.238 Additionally, the 
Guidelines emphasize that enhanced market power can result in consumer harm 
through non-price factors including a reduction in product or service offer-
ings.239 Removing reproductive health services from the relevant market should 
be evidence of consumer harm, which is of utmost importance in the antitrust 
agencies’ analysis of the anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger.240 Thus, 
when defining the relevant market to specifically address the unilateral effects of 
elimination of reproductive health services, Catholic hospital mergers should 
demand additional antitrust scrutiny under a Guidelines analysis.241 
B. Obstacles to Using Antitrust Law to Combat the Reproductive Health 
Care Effects of Rural Catholic Hospital Mergers 
Although antitrust law could be a useful method to regulate the effects of 
Catholic hospital mergers on reproductive health services, it is not a perfect 
                                                                                                                           
 236 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 20; APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 15–
16; Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 17. Eliminating a service line reduces competition for 
that service post-merger. APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 15–16. When the merging parties “elimi-
nat[e] . . . competition” in the market, it is considered a unilateral effect. HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 20. Unilateral effects are obvious in a transaction where the merging 
parties will combine to form a monopoly in the relevant market, but this is not a prerequisite. Id. 
 237 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 24 (stating that the antitrust agen-
cies “consider whether a merger is likely to give the merged firm an incentive to cease offering one of 
the relevant products sold by the merging parties.”). 
 238 See id. (noting that the agencies may find eliminating a product or service line to be anticom-
petitive); APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 16 (“The fact that a post-merger hospital is to be governed 
by religious directives prohibiting certain reproductive health services constitutes strong evidence that 
there will be a reduction of competition for these services.”). 
 239 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 2 (explaining that although the 
antitrust analysis often primarily focuses on price effects, evidence of enhanced market power can 
include non-price considerations that harm consumers, such as a decline in the variety of products and 
services offered post-merger); Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 22 (arguing that a reviewing 
court should examine a Catholic hospital merger’s impact on the variety of reproductive health ser-
vices offered post-merger as part of the antitrust analysis). 
 240 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 2 (noting that the antitrust agencies 
“normally evaluate mergers based on their impact on customers”). If consumers are harmed due to a 
lack of competition post-merger, the merger likely enhances market power. Id. 
 241 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 24 (discussing the anticompetitive, 
unilateral effects of eliminating a product post-merger); APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 20 (empha-
sizing that Catholic hospital mergers should be analyzed under the Guidelines for antitrust concerns); 
Appelbaum & Morrison, supra note 34, at 18 (explaining that when the relevant product market is 
reproductive health services, there may be antitrust concerns about the legality of the merger). 
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solution.242 First, Catholic hospital mergers present significant challenges in 
rural areas where there are no non-Catholic hospitals for patients to turn to as 
an alternative to access reproductive health services.243 Due to the cost-savings 
measures in the ACA that encourage consolidation, however, many small rural 
hospitals must merge with larger hospitals in order to survive.244 If regulators 
blocked a proposed merger between a large Catholic hospital system and a 
small rural hospital because of the anticompetitive effects of eliminating re-
productive health care services, the small rural hospital may potentially go out 
of business without the resources of the larger hospital system.245 Then, if there 
were no other hospitals in the rural area, patients would be left without any 
local health care.246 Thus, when deciding whether to block the proposed mer-
ger on antitrust grounds, regulators may be presented with a difficult choice: 
sue to stop the merger and risk the hospital closing, thus reducing access to all 
local health care, or let the merger proceed without crucial reproductive health 
care services.247 
                                                                                                                           
 242 APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 16, 20 (discussing how the reduction in competition for re-
productive health services in a relevant market is an antitrust concern, but whether antitrust enforcers 
bring a case depends on the specific facts and procompetitive justifications for the transaction). 
 243 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 24, at 24 (giving examples of patients in rural areas whose only 
hospital was Catholic); UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5–6 (listing rural hospitals across the 
country). As of 2016, there were forty-six Catholic sole community hospitals in rural areas. UTTLEY 
& KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5; see 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 (2019) (“CMS classifies a hospital as a sole 
community hospital if it is located more than [thirty-five] miles from other like hospitals . . . .”). 
 244 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 (2018) (codifying 
the ACA and introducing cost-savings measures, including expansive changes to reimbursement mod-
els); Singer, supra note 79, at 914 (describing the advantages of cost-sharing across a larger hospital 
system, as compared to a small local facility); see also notes 79–91 and accompanying text (detailing 
the impact of the ACA on hospital mergers). It is increasingly expensive to operate a hospital, and the 
ACA’s financial incentives for clinical integration encourage small hospitals to merge with larger 
hospital systems that have the requisite technology and infrastructure. Singer, supra note 79, at 914. 
 245 See Singer, supra note 79, at 914 (noting that the cost of running a hospital or physician prac-
tice has increased exponentially, and hospitals are consolidating due to economies of scale); 175 Rural 
Hospital Closures: January 2005—Present (133 Since 2010), U.N.C. CHAPEL HILL CECIL G. SHEPS 
CTR. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RES., https://www.shepscenter.unc.edu/programs-projects/rural-health/
rural-hospital-closures [https://perma.cc/X9X7-Z8E2] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020) (revealing that since 
2010, when the ACA was passed, 133 rural hospitals have closed, as compared to only forty-two rural 
hospital closures between 2005 and 2010). 
 246 See UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5 (stating that in 2016, there were forty-six Catho-
lic sole community hospitals in rural regions of the country). Because CMS defines a sole community 
hospital as one that is more than thirty-five miles from another hospital, patients that rely on these 
hospitals would be without access to any health care within thirty-five miles if the hospital closed. See 
42 C.F.R. § 412.92 (defining “sole community hospital”). 
 247 See 2018 ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 9, at 26 (stating in Directive 74 
that any acquired facility must observe the Directives); Singer, supra note 79, at 914 (highlighting that 
hospitals merge to achieve economies of scale in an increasingly expensive industry post-ACA); 175 
Rural Hospital Closures, supra note 245 (listing the increase in rural hospital closures since the pas-
sage of the ACA). Importantly, if a hospital is truly at risk of going out of business, it can raise a fail-
ing or flailing firm defense to antitrust scrutiny, as a merger involving a firm that will soon exit the 
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Additionally, many of these small hospital mergers do not meet the HSR 
size threshold for federal antitrust scrutiny, so unless a consumer or state attor-
ney general brings the proposed merger to the agency’s attention, it could be 
consummated without undergoing an antitrust review.248 Although the agencies 
can still review the proposed merger for antitrust violations, a concerned party 
would have to report the acquisition, and the antitrust agencies may not chal-
lenge these smaller transactions.249 The small, rural hospital mergers that im-
pact local reproductive health care services most significantly, therefore, may 
not even be reviewed by the antitrust agencies, so antitrust law may not be the 
best solution to concerns about access to reproductive health care.250 
Finally, rural hospital mergers that do catch the FTC’s attention may be 
exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the federal antitrust agencies’ “safety 
zone” for certain small general acute care hospital mergers.251 This policy ex-
ists to promote procompetitive mergers.252 Therefore, if a rural hospital satisfy-
                                                                                                                           
market will rarely “enhance market power.” See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95, 
at 32 (describing the requirements for a failing firm defense). In order to successfully plead a failing 
firm defense, the hospital must be (1) “unable to meet its financial obligations in the near future”; (2) 
lack the ability to reorganize under Chapter 11; and (3) have solicited other proposals to stay in the 
market and be a lesser risk to competition than the proposed merger. Id. If a rural hospital meets these 
strict requirements, it may have a defense to an otherwise anticompetitive merger and could avoid 
violating the antitrust laws. See id. (noting that the agencies will credit this claim as a defense). 
 248 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (stating that transactions worth more than $200 million must be reported 
to the antitrust agencies); Gilman et al., supra note 92 (noting that many health care mergers are worth 
less than this threshold number, and therefore are not automatically reported to the FTC and DOJ). 
 249 See Gilman et al., supra note 92 (warning that competitors, insurance companies, and state 
attorneys general may report an otherwise non-reportable transaction to the FTC for antitrust concerns 
either before or after the deal has closed). Although the FTC has challenged some recent health care 
merger cases, it has also let many others proceed. Id. For example, in 2016, the FTC settled with Cen-
traCare Health, a health care system in St. Cloud, Minnesota, that acquired St. Cloud Medical Group, a 
small physician practice group in the area. Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, Healthcare Provider in 
St. Cloud, MN Settles FTC Charges That Its Acquisition of Rival Provider Would Likely Lessen Compe-
tition for Certain Physician Services (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2016/10/healthcare-provider-st-cloud-mn-settles-ftc-charges-its [https://perma.cc/82JH-9XS3]. Alt-
hough the merging parties were the “two largest providers of adult primary care, pediatric, and 
OB/GYN services in the St. Cloud area,” St. Cloud Medical Group was struggling financially, so the 
FTC approved the merger under certain conditions in a consent order. Id. 
 250 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 24, at 24 (providing examples of patients in rural areas whose only 
hospital was Catholic and describing their experiences attempting to access reproductive health care); 
UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5–6 (listing rural Catholic hospitals across the country); Gilman 
et al., supra note 92 (explaining that small health care mergers may not be reportable under the HSR Act, 
and thus the antitrust agencies do not automatically investigate them). 
 251 STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 125; AP-
PELBAUM, supra note 212, at 18–19; Gilman et al., supra note 92. 
 252 STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 125. Thus, 
antitrust law would not be an appropriate remedy to challenge this type of merger. See id. at 9 (noting 
that a hypothetical merger would not “reduce competition substantially” under these facts). In fact, a 
merger with a larger health care system could provide value to the community, as the rural hospital 
may benefit from the resources of a large health care system. See id. (discussing the efficiencies that a 
rural hospital could achieve through merging with a larger health care system). If the acquiring health 
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ing these conditions is acquired by a large Catholic health system that abides 
by the Directives, that region loses access to reproductive health services, and 
antitrust is not a potential tool to remedy that situation.253 
The practice of antitrust law is incredibly case-specific, and the agencies’ 
decision to challenge transactions often turns on the facts.254 Antitrust law can 
be a useful tool to address Catholic hospital mergers that eliminate reproductive 
health care services in a community, but it will not be an effective remedy in all 
circumstances.255 Moreover, antitrust law is not a viable solution to counteract 
the reduction of reproductive health care services post-merger for the small, rural 
hospital mergers that federal antitrust agencies decline to investigate.256 
C. Alternative Methods to Combat Catholic Hospital Mergers 
For those hospital mergers that federal antitrust agencies do not review, 
state attorneys general may play a valuable role in preserving access to repro-
ductive health care.257 Most health care mergers may be reviewed not only at 
the federal level, but also by state regulators.258 State attorneys general may 
                                                                                                                           
care system were Catholic, however, the Directives’ prohibition on valuable reproductive health services 
could hurt the community. See UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 22, at 5–6 (discussing the increasing 
number of Catholic rural hospitals in the United States). Because the federal antitrust agencies would be 
unable to challenge this merger under antitrust law, community advocates could seek the assistance of 
state antitrust regulators instead. APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 18. 
 253 See STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 125 
(explaining the conditions for a merger to be cleared without antitrust challenges under the safety 
zone); APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 18 (noting the federal antitrust safety zone exception exists, 
but explaining that it does not apply to state attorneys general). 
 254 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 95 (explaining that when reviewing a 
proposed transaction, antitrust agencies rely on the facts and their expertise to analyze the competitive 
effects of a merger). 
 255 See STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 125, at 
9 (stating that small hospitals falling within the “safety zone” will not be challenged by antitrust en-
forcers); APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 15–16, 20 (discussing how the Directives reduce competi-
tion for reproductive health services in a relevant market, but the merits of an antitrust case under the 
Guidelines will depend on any procompetitive efficiencies). 
 256 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 24, at 24 (describing patients in rural areas with access to Catho-
lic hospitals only and detailing their reproductive health care experiences); Gilman et al., supra note 
92 (explaining that small hospital mergers may not be reportable under the HSR Act, and thus the 
antitrust agencies do not automatically investigate them for violations of antitrust law). 
 257 See APPELBAUM, supra note 212, at 18 (suggesting that, for those mergers that the federal 
antitrust agencies may not review, consumers could bring potential complaints to state attorneys gen-
eral); Dave, supra note 123 (explaining that state involvement in hospital merger challenges is benefi-
cial); Gilman et al., supra note 92 (noting that state attorneys general may also review hospital mer-
gers). 
 258 Dave, supra note 123. Although the federal antitrust agencies are authorized to investigate and 
challenge anticompetitive transactions under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, state attorneys general can 
also sue merging parties under the parens patriae doctrine. 15 U.S.C. § 18; Dave, supra note 123. 
Parens patriae enables a state to “prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen.” Parens Patriae, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8; Dave, supra note 123. The HSR Act, enacted in 1976, 
established pre-merger notification filing requirements and gave state attorneys general the right to 
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challenge a potentially anticompetitive merger under the antitrust laws, but 
they may also preserve access to reproductive health care through other means, 
such as conditioning approval of a merger upon certain requirements.259 
For example, in 2018, both the California Justice Department and the 
FTC approved the merger of Catholic Health Initiatives and Dignity Health, a 
twenty-nine billion dollar transaction that brought together 142 hospitals under 
the name CommonSpirit Health.260 As a prerequisite of the approval, however, 
the California Attorney General imposed specific conditions requiring the con-
tinued provision of emergency and reproductive health care services.261 Specif-
ically, the Attorney General required the hospitals to “maintain and provide” 
reproductive health care services at pre-transaction levels for ten years follow-
ing the merger, and during years six through ten, to alert the Attorney General 
in writing of any proposed changes, so that the state may assess their impact on 
the local population.262 
State attorneys general, who are often more attuned to local transactions 
and their potential effect on their respective communities, are well-situated to 
regulate and condition mergers that may threaten local access to reproductive 
health care services.263 Thus, their authority may be influential on those mer-
gers that are not challenged by the federal antitrust agencies.264 
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CONCLUSION 
The number of Catholic hospitals in the United States is increasing, as 
part of the overall rise in hospital merger activity since Congress passed the 
ACA. When large Catholic hospital systems acquire non-Catholic hospitals, 
they require that the non-Catholic institutions abide by the Directives, which 
prohibit a variety of medically accepted procedures, including reproductive 
health services. Thus, as Catholic hospitals amass an increasing share of the 
hospital market across the country, access to reproductive health services has 
decreased. Reproductive health care advocates have managed to combat this 
shortage in care by creating separate structural entities to continue to provide 
necessary reproductive health services that are otherwise eliminated after a 
hospital merges with a Catholic organization. The United States Catholic Con-
ference of Catholic Bishops, however, updated the Directives in 2018 to forbid 
Catholic hospitals from establishing these separate corporate entities to deliver 
prohibited medical services post-merger. This revision jeopardizes the efficacy 
of the separate structural entity remedy to preserve reproductive health ser-
vices in communities affected by Catholic hospital mergers. 
Going forward, antitrust law may be an effective solution to combat the 
elimination of reproductive health services in a merger. Removing a hospital 
service line like reproductive health care in a relevant market substantially 
lessens competition for that product, a unilateral effect that could constitute a 
violation of the Clayton Act. Antitrust law thus presents a unique opportunity 
to evaluate and counteract the anticompetitive and consumer harms presented 
by a Catholic hospital merger’s impact on access to reproductive health care 
services in a community. Of course, federal antitrust law is not a perfect solu-
tion to prevent a post-merger decrease in reproductive health services, and as 
an alternative, state attorneys general can also act decisively when approving 
hospital mergers to ensure continued access to care. 
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